



Malteser

...weil Nähe zählt.



Facts, Not Feelings

Malteser Migration Report 2021

List of Abbreviations

Asylum8 states	Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syrien
AsylbLG	Asylum Seekers Benefits Act
BA	Federal agency for work
BAMF	Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
BKA	Federal Criminal Police Office
DIVI	German Interdisciplinary Association for Intensive and Emergency Medicine
EU	European Union
Eurostat	Statistical office of the European Union
GG	Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany
IAB	Institute for Employment Research
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
MM19	Malteser Migration Report 2019
PKS	Police Crime Statistics
ProstSchG	Prostitutes Protection Act
REAG/GARP	Reintegration and Emigration Program for Asylum-Seekers in Germany / Government Assisted Repatriation Program
RKI	Robert Koch Institute
SVR Migration	Council of Experts on Integration and Immigration
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNO	United Nations Organization

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Foreword

We are experiencing an ambiguous situation with regard to migration. It is good to hear that the headlines in public and social media are no longer filled with violent emotionality. It would be desirable if this was due to the solution of the most pressing problems. However, the pressure caused by the large numbers of refugees subsided in 2020 and 2021, mainly because the coronavirus pandemic set limits to it. And stricter controls at the external borders of the European Union have no long-lasting effects. With more than 80 million refugees worldwide, never before have so many people been looking for a safe and life-sustaining place to stay as in 2020, according to the UNHCR. The causes of displacement have not been eliminated, not even reduced. The coronavirus has made them even worse.

This Malteser Migration Report 2021 does not provide any patent remedy for the underlying problems either. There is no such thing. In the wake of the two previous reports from 2017 and 2019, its aim is to continue to highlight the issue, to counter the general public mood with facts, and to help shape public opinion and generate policies on this basis. It is not directly politically motivated, but nevertheless it should help politicians to find appropriate solutions and to contribute to a debate on a justifiable basis.

Many of the necessary solutions should be found at the European level. On a national level, it is not possible to prevent the death of thousands of people, for example on their escape routes across the Mediterranean. It is more than deplorable that little progress has been made here in recent years. But this cannot be an excuse for the fact that reduced public pressure on a national level has led to a decline in efforts. Great progress has been made concerning the integration of refugees over the past five years. Even experts were positively surprised at the successes achieved in labour market integration. However, it is not just the effects of coronavirus, which are only reflected to a limited extent in the currently available data, that give rise to fears of set-backs to the progress that has been made. After 2015/16, the impetus of the population to contribute to the integration of those seeking protection into our society also seems to be decreasing in many places. Temporarily initiated programs expire without being replaced by permanent measures. This is alarming because the facts presented in this report do not provide a reason for this decline in efforts.

We would like to thank the Walter Eucken Institute headed by Prof. Lars Feld for drafting the essential chapters on the development of this situation. Without this independent and scientific basis, this desired objectivity, which is intended to create “facts, not feelings”, would



not have been possible. The new special focus on reporting on human trafficking also affects Germany directly and we are very grateful to the Ambassador of the Order of Malta, Prof. Michel Veuthey, for his informative interview. We would also like to thank Prof. Karen Horn for her perspective on the phenomenon of migration as an act of practised political freedom.

In addition, we would like to thank the countless voluntary workers who are committed to helping those seeking protection and without whom the progress of the last few years would not have been possible. Some specific examples of this are interspersed in this report. They highlight what has been achieved as well as the challenges that remain.

KARL PRINZ ZU LÖWENSTEIN,
Commissioner for the Malteser
Migration Report

Content Prologue

The years 2020 and 2021 are dominated by the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in terms of health policies, with its aim being to save human lives. At the same time, when it comes to the economy, the coronavirus crisis is keeping the world in suspense. In Germany, the economic slump in the second quarter of 2020 was the severest quarterly slump since the beginning of measuring quarterly data. In the course of 2020, the decline in gross domestic product was less than the one in the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, not least due to a strong economic upturn in the third quarter. Nevertheless, 2020 remains one of the most difficult years of the post-war period in economic terms. Despite further restrictions at the beginning of 2021, there are signs of a continuing strong upswing this year, but this will remain fragile depending on the infection rate.

Against this background, the migration issue seems to have become less important, at least losing some attention at first glance. However, first glances can be deceptive - as is so often the case. Migration is an important topic in connection with the coronavirus pandemic. Refugees live in confined spaces in refugee accommodations and are therefore exposed to a particularly high risk of becoming infected with COVID-19. The German vaccination campaign must therefore pay special attention to refugee accommodation units. If this is done based on what the authorities now know, it is still much

more difficult to contact people with a migration background in order to include them in the vaccination. These difficulties seem to have been recognized belatedly, and so specific information campaigns have now been initiated.

In addition, existing integration tasks are not being neglected due to the coronavirus pandemic. Integration into the labour market is an ongoing task. Even if the progress made so far is encouraging, it remains to be seen whether the coronavirus pandemic has interrupted the previously successful integration into the labour market. In addition, there are challenges related to the social integration of immigrants, especially refugees. They should be seen against the background of the corona pandemic in a special way. One aspect that accompanies the migration issue continuously is the connection between migration and crime, which is receiving special attention in debates in the media. In this regard, the coronavirus pandemic also plays a role.

The third Malteser Migration Report which is now available deals with all these aspects of the migration issue. First, developments in migration are presented in a stocktaking up to the current status quo. Second, integration into the labour market is of utmost importance, not least against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic. Thirdly, the report deals with the subject of crime, again in a very differentiated way, especially in addition to the refugee's perspective as a victim. Fourth, it is about the challenges



of social participation. The exceptional features of the coronavirus pandemic for the migration issue are mentioned throughout.

We hope to once again contribute to the sobering and factual analysis of the migration issue with this third Malteser Migration Report. Throughout the three migration reports presented here, respect for the magnitude of the challenge shines through, as does confidence in overcoming it. This is a particular concern of the authors.

I would like to thank the Malteser for their good cooperation in drawing up this third migration report. We would like to thank Prof. Dr. Karen I. Horn (University of Erfurt) for her guest article. Above all, however, I am very grateful to the team at the Walter Eucken Institute, Franziska Dinter, MA, Amrei Schmidt, Carolin Burkhardt and above all Katharina Pfeil, MA.

PROF. DR. DR. H.C. LARS P. FELD
Director of the Walter Eucken
Institute

Migration Trends – An Updated Overview



Migration Trends - An Updated Overview

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Lars P. Feld and Katharina Pfeil

According to information from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 82.4 million people worldwide, that means one percent of the world population, were fleeing at the end of 2020. More than half of them fled to another region within their own country. Almost a third were recognized as refugees in other countries. Less than 10% of the displaced people worldwide came to Europe.¹ By contrast, 86% of them were in developing countries. Germany ranked fifth among the main host countries after Turkey, Colombia, Pakistan and Uganda.²

This Malteser Migration Report 2021 starts with an overview of an overview of migration trends in Germany over the past two years. In addition to the migration movements and the structure of the immigrant groups, this chapter takes a look at the changes in the number of applications for asylum and the associated rulings in Germany. Furthermore, it shows the expenses for migration and integration as well as their share of the federal budget. Finally, the chapter deals with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on asylum seekers as a specific group.

Migration in 2019 and 2020

Net immigration to Germany has been decreasing since 2016. In 2019, as in 2020, more people moved to Germany than left the country. However, net migration continued to decline. Expressed in figures, this means that about 1.6 million people moved to Germany from abroad in 2019; about 1.2 million left Germany in turn (see Figure 1). In 2020, there was a stronger decline in net immigration than in the previous year, which may have been a result of the travel restrictions and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite recent developments, Germany remains a country of immigration.

This downward trend in immigration coincides with a low or declining rate of growth of the overall population in Germany.³ In 2019, the population increased to about 83.2 million people, which corresponds to an increase of 0.2% compared to 2018. In 2020, however, population did not continue to grow for the first time since 2011, according to preliminary estimates. In fact, it was even declining in the first two quarters of 2020. The reasons for this decline are a slightly lower birth rate and an increased death rate in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic.


Since 2010, internal migration within the EU has consistently accounted for a significant percentage of immigration to Germany. In 2019, however, the number decreased compared to 2018 (see Figure 2). The balance of immigration and emi-

¹ See European Commission (2020). Immigration into European society - a snapshot. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_de, last accessed on June 9th, 2021.

² See UNHCR (2021). Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2020.

³ See Federal Bureau of Statistics (2021). No population growth expected in 2020.

Figure 1:
In and outbound cross German border migration



Note: The 2020 figures are preliminary at the time of going to press.

Source: German Federal Bureau of Statistics

gration of EU citizens decreased to about 56,500 people in 2019.

Overall, rates of immigration and emigration of people from third countries have changed slightly compared to the previous year. Romania was the main country of origin with a net immigration of about 46,200 people. Syria comes second with about 31,300 people. Another important country of origin is India: net immigration of Indian nationals has risen continuously during the last decade to about 22,000 people in 2019.


4.5 m

WAS THE NET IMMIGRATION TO GERMANY FROM 2010 TO 2019. IN 2020, IT FELL FOR THE FIFTH YEAR IN A ROW.

WITH 46,200

IMMIGRANTS, THE EU MEMBER STATE ROMANIA WAS AGAIN THE MAIN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN IN 2019.

Figure 2:
Migration balance by immigration groups



Note: Romania and Syria were the main countries of origin of the respective group in the years 2015 to 2019. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland are also included in EU internal migration.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics 2020; own representation.

BY **2%**

THE POPULATION WITH A MIGRANTION
BACKGROUND INCREASED IN 2019.

52%

OF THE PEOPLE WITH A MIGRATION BACKGROUND
WERE GERMAN CITIZENS IN 2019.

21.2 m

PEOPLE IN GERMANY HAD A MIGRATION
BACKGROUND IN 2019.

65%

OF PEOPLE WITH A MIGRATION BACKGROUND
WERE EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR
DESCENDANTS.

Population from an immigrant background and social demography of asylum seekers


According to a quarterly population count, the population in Germany was about 81.8 million in 2019 (see Figure 3). Of this figure, 26% had a migration background (+ 0.5 percentage points compared to the previous year). Two out of three people from an immigrant background were born abroad and immigrated to Germany. In 2019, about 5.1 million people from an immigrant background and with migration experience had German citizenship.

Almost two thirds of the people from an immigrant background were of European origin, i.e., had immigrated from a European country or were descendants of a person who immigrated from a European country. The most important countries of origin were Turkey (about 2.8 million), Poland (about 2.2 million), Russia (about 1.4 million) and Romania (about 1.0 million). 22% of the population from an immigrant background came from Asia.⁴

At an average age of about 36 years, the population from an immigrant background was on average younger than that without a migrant background (about 47 years). The differences in gender ratio were marginal: at the end of 2019, 49% of the people from an immigrant background were female, whereas the proportion of women among people without a migration background was 51%.

About 1.8 million asylum seekers were among the population with a foreign citizenship in Germany (two percent of the total population) at the end of 2019. Compared to the previous year, their number increased by three percent. This represents the smallest increase in asylum seekers since 2012. Asylum seekers are people who are in Germany for humanitarian reasons. Possible reasons are protection from persecution or threat to

Figure 3:
Population with and without a migration background
In 2019



Note: A person has a migration background if either the person or at least one of their parents did not have German citizenship as from birth. The total population in private households differs slightly from other statistics with 81.8 million people in the micro-census.

Source: German Federal Bureau of Statistics 2020.

⁴ See Federal Bureau of Statistics (2020). Population with migration background grew by 2.1% in 2019: the smallest increase since 2011.

67%


OF THE ASYLUM SEEKERS CAME FROM THE ASYLUM8 STATES AT THE END OF 2019.

life on the grounds of race, religion or nationality. This includes people with a recognized or rejected application for asylum as well as people with pending asylum procedures.

The so-called asylum8 states play a special role.⁵ Compared to 2018, the number of people from these countries increased by about 53,000 to 1.24 million people (see Figure 4). Here, the growth was slowing down and amounted to 8% in 2018

⁵ The asylum8 states comprise the countries of origin of asylum Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria. Although the country composition has changed due to trends in asylum applications the aggregate of the main asylum countries of origin for time series comparisons has not been changed in the statistics. See Federal Employment Agency (2021).

Figure 4:
Changes in numbers of asylum seekers in Germany



Note: The number of people from the asylum8 states is shown individually and relates to the fixed date of December 31, 2019.

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics 2020; own representation.

and 4% in 2019 compared to the previous year. As in previous years, two out of three asylum seekers came from the asylum8 states at the end of 2019.

The group of asylum seekers differs considerably from the resident population. Figure 5 shows the age and gender structure of asylum seekers compared to the total population and the foreign population. Concerning the group of the 18- to 30-year-olds, the majority of these asylum seekers (about 72%) were male, and their proportion is significantly higher in comparison to the foreign population and the total population. The average age of the asylum seekers was 29.5 years as at 31 December 2019.


Development of applications for asylum since 2017

The monthly values of applications for asylum have been at a constant level since January 2017. From January to April 2021, about 56,700 applications for asylum were submitted in Germany, including about 37,300 first-time applications. Compared to the previous year, applications for asylum increased by 23% (see Figure 6).⁶ On the basis of about 60,300 decided applications, the protection rate was 31%. About 16% of asylum seekers were recognized as refugees in accordance with section 3 of the Asylum Act. According to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), about 58,100 applications for asylum were outstanding at the end of April 2021.

However, the development of the asylum figures for 2020 must be considered in the light of the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic (see the section “Effects of the COVID-19 pandemic”). In 2020, a total of about 122,200 applications for asylum were submitted, about 102,600 of which were first-time applications. Compared to 2019, the number of applications for asylum fell significantly by 26% and was below the 2013 level.

⁶ The comparison with figures for the previous months is limited due to subsequent changes.

Figure 5:
Age structure of asylum seekers compared to the total population and foreign population in Germany in 2019



Note: For better comparability, the number of people in each group refers to 1,000 people respectively. The number of asylum seekers relates to the fixed date of December 31, 2019. Foreign population means people who are not only staying in Germany temporarily (three months or more) and who do not have German citizenship.

Source: German Federal Bureau of Statistics 2020.

Refusals of entry and border controls due to the COVID-19 pandemic are likely to have aggravated this decline significantly. In 2020, the main countries of origin included Syria (about 36,400 first-time applications), Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey. Afghanistan is the only country where applications for asylum submitted in Germany increased compared to the previous year (+ 4%). Applications from Nigeria and Iran, on the other hand, decreased the most. The total protection rate based on about 145,100 asylum decisions was 43% – which was higher than in previous years (2019: 38%). This means that more than two out of five people who applied for asylum in Germany were granted a protection status. The adjusted overall protection⁷ rate was 57%, which is also a small increase compared to the previous year. 26% were granted refugee protection, one

percent of which were given the right to asylum in accordance with the Basic Law. Furthermore, 13% of the applicants were granted subsidiary protection and four percent were prohibited from being deported.⁸ 32% of applications for asylum were rejected in 2020.


The duration of an asylum procedure averaged eight months in 2020 and was therefore significantly longer compared to six months in 2019.⁹ The reason given for procedures being delayed was the COVID-19 pandemic, as notifications of

⁷ For the adjusted total protection rate, 36,000 (25%) of the applications which remained without a decision were calculated in 2020. These cases with a so-called formal decision occur when Germany is not responsible for processing an application or an asylum application is withdrawn.

⁸ The individual protection statuses are explained in detail in the second chapter of the MM19.

⁹ See Bundestag printed document No. 19/27531, answer to question 41. At the time of going to press, information on the processing time, depending on the country of origin, was not yet available, see Bundestag printed document No. 19/29300.

Figure 6:
Development of asylum applications and asylum decisions (first-time and subsequent applications) from January 2015 to April 2021



Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2021.

rejection were temporarily suspended due to measures concerning infection protection. In addition, the BAMF branch offices mainly closed pending procedures in the months with lower numbers of asylum seekers.¹⁰ About 52,100 asylum procedures were still outstanding at the end of 2020.

In 2020, the proportion of men among first-time asylum applicants in Germany was higher at 58% than the proportion of women. However, the proportion of women among asylum seekers has increased since 2016. One in four applications (about 26,500) was filed for a child born in Germany under the age of one year. The group of people under 30 made up more than three quarters of all first-time asylum applicants. Only 0.5% of the first-time asylum applicants were 65 years or older.¹¹ The age structure indicates that early childhood care and education are of great importance for the integration of asylum seekers.

Since 2012, people with a Syrian citizenship who fled from the civil war in Syria have accounted for the largest proportion of asylum seekers in Germany. Although their share of the total of asylum applications has decreased in recent years, it was still 35% in 2020. About 89% of them were granted protection status in 2020. The adjusted overall protection rate for people with Syrian citizenship was 99.8%, there were 55 rejections out of 38,710 decisions in 2020. The protection rate for Eritrean nationals was also very high at 91%, as in the previous year.

There are four forms of protection (entitlement to asylum, refugee protection, subsidiary protection, deportation prohibition) that can be granted in the event of a positive asylum application.¹² Most asylum seekers from Eritrea were granted refugee status (55%) or subsidiary protection (18%) (see Figure 7). Compared to the previous year, the refugee status of Eritrean people in-

creased significantly by ten percentage points, whereas subsidiary protection decreased slightly. People from Syria were granted refugee status in 48% of the cases decided and subsidiary protection in 40% of the cases decided. Here, the refugee status decreased slightly, while subsidiary protection increased by seven percentage points. The granting of refugee status increased across all countries of origin once again. The proportion of people who received refugee protection on the basis of family protection, i.e. relatives of refugees already recognized in Germany, made up 85% (2019: 81%, 2017: 25%). Deportation prohibitions were most frequently found among asylum seekers from Afghanistan (24%).

About 10,800 people were deported from Germany in 2020 (see Figure 8). At the same time, about 5,700 people left Germany voluntarily under the REAG/GARP program financially funded by the federal government. Deportations and voluntary returns significantly decreased compared to the previous year (- 51%), which is related to the travel restrictions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.¹³ The number of voluntary and sponsored return trips decreased by 56% compared to 2019.¹⁴

Asylum seekers in Europe

In 2020, about 471,900 people applied for asylum in the 27 EU Member States, according to the European Statistical Office (Eurostat). This corresponds to a decrease of 48% compared to the previous year. First-time asylum applications alone fell by 34%. As in the previous year, Syria, Afghanistan, Venezuela and Colombia were among the main countries of origin.¹⁵ In terms of the number of filed asylum applications compared to the number of inhabitants, Germany

¹⁰ See Bundestag printed document No. 19/25435, answer to question 57.

¹¹ See BAMF (2021). The Federal Office in figures in 2020 - Asylum module.


¹² An explanation of the four forms of protection can be found in Chapter 2 of the 2019 Maltese Migration Report.

¹³ See Bundestag printed document No. 19/21406 and No. 19/27007. The subsidies from the federal and state program REAG/GARP are preliminary figures (approvals) made available by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

¹⁴ See Bundestag printed document No. 19/18201 and No. 19/8021.

¹⁵ See Eurostat (2021).

Figure 7:
Decisions on first-time asylum applications for the asylum8 states and Turkey in 2020




Note: "Formal decisions" are procedures without substantive examination of the asylum application, i.e. when applicants withdraw their applications or another EU member state is responsible (Dublin III Regulation). For better readability, values below four percent are not shown.

The BAMF designates substantive decisions for the recognition of persons entitled to political asylum (Art. 16 Basic Law and family asylum) as a sub-category of the legal status as a refugee (Art. 3 para. 1 AsylG, Art 16 a Basic Law).

Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2021.

Figure 8:
Changes in numbers of deportations



Source: Bundestag printed documents No. 18/4025, 18/7588, 18/11112, 19/800, 19/8021, 19/18201, 19/21406, 19/27007.

AROUND **102,600**

PEOPLE APPLIED FOR ASYLUM FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 2020.

66%

OF THE FIRST-TIME APPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUM WERE MADE BY PEOPLE FROM THE ASYLUM8 STATES IN 2020.


1.8 m

ASYLUM SEEKERS WERE LIVING IN GERMANY AS OF THE END OF 2019.

ranked tenth in an EU-wide comparison in 2020 (see Figure 9). Most asylum applications were filed in Cyprus, followed by Malta and Greece. Germany, Spain, France, Greece and Italy together accepted 80% of the first-time asylum applicants in the EU.

In 2020, approximately 95,000 people fled via the Mediterranean route to Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Greece and Spain (- 28,600 compared to 2019). After 62,000 people, almost twice as many as in the previous year, had made their way to Greece by sea in 2019, the number of people who had fled to Spain via the so-called West African route increased again in 2020. In addition to pandemic-related factors, this shift is probably due to the situation on islands such as Lesbos with their overcrowded reception centres and longer waiting periods. At the beginning of 2020, the five reception and identification centres on the Greek islands, which were initially designed for 5,400 people, were overcrowded tenfold. In the Moria centre on the island of Lesbos, which was originally designed for 2,500 people, 18,000 people were recorded in February 2020. This centre was destroyed by fire in September 2020.¹⁶

Figure 9:
Number of submitted asylum applications in relation to the population (per 1,000 inhabitants) in a European comparison



¹⁶ See SVR Migration (2020). Facts about immigration in Germany, UN refugee aid (2021). Escape to Europe; Full refugee camps and an overloaded reception system; UNHCR (2021). Mediterranean situation.

Source: Eurostat 2021; own calculations.



The COVID-19 team actively supported the construction of the test station, too.

The COVID-19 team has many tasks

By Daniel Boss

When a patient's temperature gets too high or his/her condition deteriorates in any other way, Akram Almossa immediately picks up his smartphone. Many times he had to call the emergency doctor to the "quarantine house" in Lorch am Rhein because of COVID-19. Since the beginning of the epidemic, people infected with COVID-19 and contact persons have been accommodated in the former medical building of the Federal Armed Forces, strictly separated from each other, of course. They are refugees from shared accommodation units or private apartments in the region around Mainz, where Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate meet.

Akram Almossa, born in Syria in 1989, has been taking care of them in Germany since 2015. He himself has an apartment in Lorch, but for weeks he has preferred to live in a room in the quarantine house that was furnished for him. So he is

very close to the people entrusted to him day and night. These include families with young children as well as elderly and chronically ill people. With their shopping lists in his hand, he goes for them to the supermarket and discount store. In the centre, he keeps an eye on high hygiene standards and regular medication intakes for diabetics or high blood pressure patients. He plays with the girls and boys and makes sure that the people in their isolated situation don't get cabin fever. He measures their body temperature twice a day and encourages them. Often he can do this in his native language, Arabic. "But I can communicate with all the residents. It doesn't matter what language they speak", says Akram Almossa. Communication always works somehow. Sometimes also in German, which the Syrian has learned over the past five years. He does not have a wife or children and his parents stayed in the war-torn country.

COVID-19 as a colossal task for everyone involved

Akram Almossa has been working as an integration assistant for the Malteser charity since 2016 and has got to know the entire spectrum of the task in practice. From the outset he has been part of the regional COVID-19 team that was launched in April 2020 as a social responsibility and solidarity initiative. Most of them have a migration background and come from Afghanistan, Iraq or Burkina Faso. Providing support for the quarantine centres around Bingen and Mainz is one of their main tasks. By mid-April 2021, a total of around 830 COVID-19 patients and more than 1,400 contact persons had been cared for, always in close cooperation with the local public health departments. In Mainz alone, around 120 people were accommodated in such a facility at the same time at peak times - half of them with positive test results.

Behrouz Asadi, head of the Malteser migration office in Rhineland-Palatinate/Hesse and responsible for the COVID-19 team, speaks of a "colossal task". "The group accepted the challenge and tried to make the most of it," he says. The helpers are also on duty on weekends and public holidays as well as at night in order to be able to care for the people in quarantine. Because it is sometimes really a matter of life and death, this task is associated with a "tremendous responsibility", according to the head of the migration office. In addition, it means putting yourself at risk due to the close contact: everyone has volunteered to work for the people affected despite the danger of infection. The team has now been vaccinated.

Support wherever it is needed

Refugees help refugees in times of the pandemic - this could be the motto of the project. But the support should be for everyone's benefit. "Origin, gender or religion do not play any role," emphasizes Behrouz Asadi. "We started the COVID-19 team campaign to provide people with food and to fetch prescriptions and

medication for them. So they could stay at home and reduce contacts." In the early period, thousands of face masks were sewn and distributed to people in social institutions. In February, Akram Almossa and his colleagues helped then to repack medical masks from bulk packs into smaller bags in order to ensure their hygienic distribution. 143,000 masks were packed for the Mainz-Bingen district in this way.

In addition, the COVID-19 team was involved in setting up a test station and prepared the logistics: in the Mainz "House of Cultures" in the summer of 2020, several dozen travelers were tested for the virus daily. Testing in kindergartens has been at the top of the agenda since the second COVID-19 spring. The team is on the road with the so-called "lollipop quick tests", which are not as uncomfortable for the little children as the cotton buds in their noses. There are around 60 daycare centres in Mainz alone.

To help is to help

When the issue of the night-time curfew became acute, the COVID-19 team immediately considered another campaign: homeless people could spend the night in specially set up emergency shelters. "We hope that we can make a contribution to combating the pandemic with our COVID-19 team," says Behrouz Asadi.

Akram Almossa, like many of his colleagues on a full-time and voluntary basis, is happy that he can help. By his own admission, the 32-year-old is not annoyed by the fact that gratitude is not always shown to him. "To help is to help," he says.

70 years of the Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC)

On July 28, 1951, 19 states signed the “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”, which is known today as the “Geneva Refugee Convention”, in response to the ongoing refugee issue after the Second World War. At the time of the first signing, the focus was mainly on European refugees. However, the 1967 protocol expanded the original limitations in terms of time and geography, making the agreements applicable to refugees worldwide since then.¹⁷ Since its founding, 149 countries, including Germany, have signed the convention.¹⁸

According to the UNHCR, the Geneva Refugee Convention is “the most important international document for refugee protection”.¹⁹ This was the first time that the term refugee was legally defined. In addition, the rights²⁰ and obligations²¹ of refugees were determined and it was defined which groups of people are not entitled to refugee status (e.g., war criminals).²² Another central part is the so-called “non-refoulement principle”, according to which people who flee from their native country because of persecution may not be rejected.²³

The convention constitutes a general legal framework serving as a basis for national asylum policy. Since the signing of the convention, the UNHCR has been entrusted with monitoring its compliance. Against the background of increasing refugee numbers worldwide, it is becoming clear that the Geneva Refugee Convention continues to be of great importance 70 years after it was signed.

¹⁷ See §1 para. 2 Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees in 1967.

¹⁸ See UNHCR (2021). The Geneva Refugee Convention.

¹⁹ See UNHCR (2021). The Geneva Refugee Convention.

²⁰ See §12 ff. Geneva Refugee Convention.

²¹ See §2 p.1 Geneva Refugee Convention.

²² See §1 para. F Geneva Refugee Convention

²³ See §33 para. 1 Geneva Refugee Convention.


Economic and fiscal aspects of asylum-related immigration since 2018

For the financial year 2019, the Federal State, the Länder, the municipalities and Social Security funds generated a surplus, as in previous years. The federal government's total expenditure on asylum-related immigration amounted to about 23 billion euros in 2019. According to the categorization system used by the Federal Ministry, a distinction can be made between expenditure on combating the causes of flight and expenditure on domestic services can be distinguished. The latter consist of expenses that are taken over directly by the federal government, as well as relief payments from the federal government to the Länder and municipalities. Expenditures to combat the causes of displacement added up to about 8.4 billion euros in 2019 (see Figure 10). Domestic services accounted for about 14.6 billion euros, about 6.3 billion euros of which was allocated to the Länder and municipalities.

For 2020, it was expected a total expenditure was expected to be roughly in line with previous years. Expenditures of around 13.4 billion euros were planned for domestic services, whereas around 8.9 billion euros were budgeted for combating the causes of displacement. The share of relief provided for the Länder and municipalities should only be around 3.7 billion euros in 2020 (- 2.6 billion euros) and should continue to decline sharply over the next few years.²⁴ However, it has taken some time to recognize the increased need for integration services and social transfers. As planned, expenditure on integration measures and expenditure on social security benefits in particular is continuing to run at over two billion and over six billion euros a year respectively. E\Reception, registration and accommodation expenditure in the course of the asylum procedure is scheduled to be around 1.2 billion euros annually.

²⁴ In 2020, the federal states are to receive a block grant of 700 million euros for refugee-related purposes (2021: 500 million euros). The relief of the municipalities from the costs of accommodation and heating has been extended until 2021. See Bundestag printed document No. 19/14246.

Figure 10:
Federal asylum-related benefits (in billion euros)



Note: The list is about planning from 2020 onwards.

Source: Finance plan of the Federal Ministry of Finance 2020 and Bundestag printed documents No. 19/22601 and 19/19780; own calculations.

In Germany, a large part of the tasks relating to the reception and integration of asylum seekers is the responsibility of the Länder, which have been financially supported by the federal government since 2016. Support for the Länder and municipalities was around 6.3 billion euros in 2019 (- 1.2 billion euros compared to 2018).

The Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (AsylbLG) regulates the financial resources that asylum seekers and tolerated persons receive from the German state. A single adult in the asylum procedure who is no longer accommodated in an initial reception facility is allocated a total of 351 euros per month. By comparison, the basic rate within the unemployment benefit II for the subsistence level was 432 euros since January 1, 2020. Asylum seekers are entitled to unemployment benefit II after a period of 18 months living in Germany or after completing the asylum procedure. In September 2019, the AsylbLG was reformed and the cash benefit rates were rescaled. In addition,

8.4 bn

EUROS, THIS WAS THE BUDGET ITEM FOR COMBATING THE CAUSES OF MIGRATION IN 2019.

6.3 bn

EURO WERE REIMBURSED TO THE FEDERAL STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES FOR REIMBURSEMENT BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN 2019.

refugees who were studying or in training were included in the group of benefit recipients. Reductions in benefits have been decided for asylum seekers who are obliged to leave the country and for people who do not comply with the obligation to cooperate in the asylum procedure or integration measures.²⁵


Compared to 2018, the number of beneficiaries decreased by six percent to around 385,000 at the end of 2019 (see Figure 11). Compared to 2015, this corresponds to a decrease of more than 60%. This decrease can be explained by a larger number of asylum decisions and the reduction of pending procedures, which is why fewer people were in ongoing asylum procedures. According-

ly, the annual gross expenditure under the AsylbLG continued to decrease in 2019 and amounted to around 4.4 billion euros (- 10% compared to 2018).

75% of the beneficiaries were in an asylum procedure, 19 percent belonged to the group of tolerated persons.

²⁵ See Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2019). Reform of the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act.

Figure 11:
Gross expenditure (in billions of euros, left scale) and recipients of benefits (right scale) within the AsylbLG



*Note: recipients of asylum seekers' benefits as of December 31st.
"Special services" mainly include health and care services.*

Source: German Federal Bureau of Statistics 2020.

Effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on migration flows and the situation in asylum centres

The COVID-19 pandemic bears particular risks for refugees worldwide, as they are often accommodated in densely populated refugee camps, in initial reception facilities or in shared accommodation where hygiene and distance rules as well as medical care are difficult to implement. The pandemic also has a significant effect on regular and irregular migrations.²⁶ According to the UNHCR, up to 164 countries worldwide had closed their borders completely or partially in order to slow the spread of the coronavirus. 99 countries made no exception for asylum seekers.²⁷ In "Basic Recommendations for Refugee Protection in Times of COVID-19", the UNHCR pointed out to Germany that the entry of asylum seekers had to be guaranteed and that at the same time health protection had to be ensured by means of quarantine regulations and tests upon entry. Otherwise, entry restrictions could affect public health.²⁸

Entry restrictions and asylum procedures

To check the occurrence of infection, Federal Minister of the Interior Seehofer ordered temporary controls at the borders to Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg and Denmark as well as extensive entry restrictions at the German Schengen external borders (third countries) in March 2020. Travel which is not absolutely necessary has been restricted.²⁹

The entry restrictions for people from third countries have been relaxed since July 2020. People from third countries with a low rate of new infections are allowed to re-enter without restrictions. Since May 2021, Australia, Israel, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand have been among third countries with low infection rates. China, including Hong Kong and Macau, will be added to this list as soon as entry is

deemed to be possible on both sides. The list is checked regularly. People from risk areas in third countries must comply with the same quarantine regulations as people from risk areas in the Schengen area. When coming from a third country that is not listed, entry is only possible for people who live in Germany, have relatives in Germany, perform an important function or whose travel is absolutely necessary. The groups of people who are German citizens, who have an existing right of residence in Germany or who belong to certain professional groups (e.g., health workers, seasonal workers in agriculture or students) are excluded from the entry restrictions.³⁰

Although asylum seekers are generally exempted from the entry restrictions, the number of first-time asylum applications fell significantly compared to the previous year. In March 2021, asylum applications in the EU were only two thirds of the pre-pandemic level.³¹

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, BAMF changed its admission process. In spring 2020, regular operations were temporarily suspended and an application procedure in written form was introduced. Furthermore, no negative notifications were issued at times, as it was difficult to resort to legal remedies. Returns to other EU countries (Dublin transfers) and voluntary returns via the REAG/GARP program were also suspended due to the pandemic. In the summer of 2020, the regular operation of the asylum and revocation procedures in the BAMF branch offices was gradually resumed. This means that applications could be made personally again and personal consultations and hearings on asylum procedures took place under the given infection control measures. Written first-time and subsequent applications are possible until the end of May 2021. Dublin transfers were resumed in mid-June 2020 and asylum seekers were transferred back to the EU country where they first arrived.³²

²⁶ See Giesing, Y., & Hofbauer, M. (2020).

²⁷ See UNHCR (2021). Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2020.

²⁸ See UNHCR (2020). Basic UNHCR recommendations on refugee protection in times of COVID-19.

²⁹ See Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (2021). Temporary border controls at the internal borders to Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg and Denmark.

³⁰ See Federal Foreign Office (2021). Information on entry restrictions, test and quarantine requirements in Germany.

³¹ See European Asylum Support Office (2021). Latest Asylum Trends.

³² See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2021). Asylum and revocation procedures in the branch offices of the Federal Office (as of May 27, 2021).


Due to the border closures to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, net immigration decreased to around 74,000 people in the first half of 2020, compared to 167,000 in the first half of 2019 (see Figure 12).³³ In January 2021, too, net immigration was below that of the previous year, which is due to a sharp decrease in immigration (32% compared to the same month of the previous year).

COVID-19 cases in asylum facilities

Already at the beginning of the pandemic, attention was drawn to an increased risk of infection in reception centres and shared forms of accommodation. The RKI justified this assessment with the fact that distance rules can only be implemented to a limited extent in confined spaces and shared rooms. In order to prevent the spread of infections and to protect people in shared accommodations, the centres should

³³ See Federal Bureau of Statistics (2020). Population decreased slightly in the first half of 2020.

Figure 12:
Monthly immigrations and emigrations across German borders in 2020



Source: German Federal Bureau of Statistics 2021

develop a concept for spatial separation of confirmed cases of COVID-19, contact persons and other persons. This should avoid the quarantine of entire facilities or large groups.³⁴ However, Jahn et al. (2021) found that the entire accommodation was quarantined after a positive test in 75% of the asylum shelters examined. The duration averaged 19 days. Such a "collective quarantine" increases both the risk of infection and the psychological stress caused by the pandemic and contradicts the recommendations of the RKI.³⁵

According to information provided by the UNHCR in February 2021, around 49,200 refugees in 105 countries were infected with COVID-19 worldwide; 446 people have died from or with the virus.³⁶ According to the RKI status report of May 26, 2021, around 9,100 COVID-19 cases have been reported by asylum seekers in shared forms of accommodation in Germany since the beginning of the pandemic. 433 people (5%) of them were hospitalized and eleven deaths occurred. In addition, there are 385 employees in shared accommodations who were reported to the RKI as COVID-19 cases.³⁷ In mid-August 2020, the average number of cases per outbreak in such a facility was the highest compared to other infectious environments (an average of 21 cases per outbreak).³⁸ By June 2020, Jahn et al. (2021) estimates the average spread potential among residents of a reception facility at 13%, based on media coverage.³⁹ Conventional measures such

³⁴ See Robert Koch Institute (2020). Recommendations for local public health departments on the prevention and management of COVID-19 diseases in reception centres and shared accommodations for asylum seekers (for the purpose of Sections 44, 53 AsylG) (as of December 1, 2020).

³⁵ See Bozorgmehr et al. (2020).

³⁶ See UNHCR (2021). UNHCR's Global COVID-19 Needs, February 2021. UNHCR refers to refugees and displaced persons in regard to these figures.

³⁷ To classify these numbers, it must be taken into account that information about the facility is only available for a subset of COVID-19 cases and that this is not representative of all cases. See Robert Koch Institute (2021). Daily status report of the RKI on Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19).

³⁸ See Robert Koch Institute (2020). Epidemiological Bulletin 38/2020 of September 17, 2020.

³⁹ The spread potential is calculated using the total number of cases per outbreak as a proportion of the number of residents in the respective municipal accommodation. See Jahn et al. (2021). Sars-CoV-2 attack rate in reception and accommodation centres for asylum seekers: systematic review of outbreak media reports in Germany.

as isolating those who were tested positive or their contact persons halved the spread potential compared to collective quarantine.

Since nationality, origin or religion are not included in the reports of COVID-19 cases according to the Federal Ministry of Health, the Robert Koch Institute and the German Interdisciplinary Association for Intensive Care and Emergency Medicine (DIVI), a data-based statement regarding the relationship between people with a migration background and a COVID-19 infection is not possible in Germany. An analysis of 15 international studies shows a tendency towards an increased risk of COVID-19 diseases concerning people with a migration background.⁴⁰ There is a connection between the risk of infection and outbreak and other factors such as the living environment in confined collective forms of group accommodation and reception centres, working conditions in health and caring professions, seasonal or physical work as well as limited health insurance coverage. This suggests that certain groups of immigrants require special health protection and should be specifically addressed in education, test and vaccination programs.

It must be pointed out, however, that the data situation concerning COVID-19 in connection with migration is still inadequate. The effectiveness of containment measures has not yet been investigated systematically and a scientific review of evidence would require improved reporting systems or specific surveys in relation to the facility concerned.

The availability of data on the number of refugees infected, depending on the respective federal state or type of asylum facility, is still poor as of May 2021. An inquiry directed to the state authorities by the integration media service revealed over 6,000 people infected with COVID-19 in the federal states' reception facilities since the beginning of the pandemic up to January 2021. About 36,000 refugees were accommodated in these facilities.⁴¹ In Bavaria, the number of cases has doubled to about 1,400 within four

months, it has tripled in Hesse and Berlin (about 700 and 1,100 respectively) and, in Rhineland-Palatinate there were four times as many COVID-19 cases in January 2021 as in October 2020 (around 700). The discrepancy between the number of cases reported by the RKI can be explained by the fact that some Länder did not transmit any information and that different reference dates were considered. Cases of infection in municipal accommodation centres were not systematically recorded.⁴²

⁴⁰ See Hintermeier et al. (2020). SARS-CoV-2 among migrants and forcibly displaced populations: a rapid systematic review.

⁴¹ See Media Service Integration (2021). Refugee accommodations badly affected.

⁴² See Media Service Integration (2021). Refugee accommodation centres badly affected.

A close-up, profile view of a young woman with dark hair, wearing a blue work uniform and large yellow earplugs. She is focused on her work, using a tool to adjust a component on a large, metallic aircraft engine. The background is blurred, showing the industrial setting of an aircraft hangar with various mechanical parts and lighting.

Labour Market – The Influence of Migration



Labour Market - The Influence of Migration

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld and Katharina Pfeil

The development of the German labour market has recently been heavily influenced by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The previously dynamic employment growth collapsed and unemployment increased as a result of the economic shock. The individual immigration groups and their integration into the labour market were affected differently by the relocation to the home office, by the switch to short-time work or by reductions in working hours. In particular, the hitherto positive integration of refugees into the labour market came to a standstill as a result of the pandemic. The effects of the second lockdown from November 2020 onwards cannot yet be finally assessed. Nevertheless, it became apparent from the labour market developments in spring 2021 that the pandemic-related restrictions in winter had less serious effects on the situation of immigrants in the German labour market than the first lockdown.

This chapter describes the development of the labour market over the past two years. In addition to the change in employment subject to social insurance contributions, the focus is on employment and unemployment rates as well as wages and activities for various immigrant groups. An insight into business start-ups by people with and without a migration background as well as the presentation of recent developments in the training market lead up to further factors affecting labour market integration such as the role of moonlighting, the trust of the residential population, discrimination and social networks. Finally, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on refugees within the labour market will be examined.

Developments in the labour market since 2019

In the context of free movement of workers in the EU and the Western Balkans Regulation, people from countries that were included in the eastern expansion of the EU and people from the Western Balkans have played a key role in relation to the growth in employment in the German labour market in recent years.⁴⁴ The employment of people from the asylum states also developed in a positive way. However, with the economic downturn, the COVID-19 pandemic and the collapse in overall economic production in the second quarter of 2020, the conditions under which this employment growth had taken place changed. As a result, the volume of work in Germany declined sharply and the constant growth in employment, which lasted almost ten years after the financial crisis, has stalled for the time being (see Figure 13).⁴⁵

According to projections by the Federal Employment Agency, a total of 33.63 million people in Germany are currently in employment subject to social insurance contributions (as of March 2021). Compared to the previous year, there was a decrease of 16,000 people, with March 2020 being the first month affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Low-paid employment decreased even more sharply, falling by around 347,000 to 6.9 million employees compared to the same

⁴⁴ The countries of the EU's eastward expansion (so-called EU-11) include Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The Western Balkans include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia.

⁴⁵ See Federal Employment Agency (2021). Effects of migration on the labor market.

month of the previous year. Almost half of these job cuts occurred in the catering industry.⁴⁶

Concerning the foreign population, the number of employees up to February 2021 was available at the time of going to press. In relation to the German population, whose employment fell by 0.7% in February 2021 compared to the previous year, employment among the foreign population increased by two percent. Compared to the previous year, the increase in employment of people from the asylum⁸ states was comparatively strong (eight percent), following a decline in January 2021. This means that, in February 2021, a total of around 390,000 people from the main asylum countries of origin were employed subject to social security contributions. There were also around 65,000 marginally employed people. At


14%, the proportion of exclusively marginally employed persons was comparatively high. The reasons for this are time restrictions due to participations in integration courses and a lack of language or occupational skills. Marginal employment offers a low-threshold entry into the labour market.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ See Bruttel, O., & Ohlert, C. (2020).

TOTAL
455,000
PEOPLE FROM THE ASYLUM⁸ STATES
WERE SUBJECT TO SOCIAL INSURANCE
CONTRIBUTIONS (390,000) OR MARGINALLY
EMPLOYED (65,000) IN FEBRUARY 2021.

⁴⁶ See Federal Employment Agency (2021). Monthly report on the labor and training market.

Figure 13:
Change in employment subject to social insurance contributions compared to the previous month of the previous year



Source: Federal Employment Agency, 2021.


Interpretation aid for the employment and unemployment rates of persons from the asylum8 states

Access to the labour market for asylum seekers and tolerated persons is initially restricted, as there is an prohibition of employment for up to six months in the first three months after arrival and during their accommodation in an initial reception center. Applicants and tolerated persons from safe countries of origin (EU, the Western Balkans Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia as well as Ghana and Senegal) are subject to a general prohibition of employment during the asylum proceedings, but are not recorded as unemployed. This means that the level of and the change in the number of asylum seekers and tolerated asylum seekers influence the employment rate.

Other central indicators for the progress of labour market integration are the unemployment and employment rates, as they take changes in the labour supply and population into account. Therefore, it is possible to compare different immigration groups directly with each other (see Figure 14 and Figure 17). The employment rate results from the share of the working age population (15 to 65 years) in the total population in this age range. The unemployment rate puts the registered unemployed in relation to all economically active persons (employed plus unemployed).

In the medium term, the integration of immigrants into the German labour market has developed positively, although there are clear differences between the individual immigrant groups. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic represented a

Figure 14:
Employment rates of the German and foreign population between 15 and 65 years of age (employment subject to social insurance contributions and marginal employment)



Note: Due to a significant under-reporting of the initial data on marginal part-time employment in November 2019, the Federal Employment Agency does not report the employment rates for November 2020. The line for foreigners records the employment rate for the group of all foreigners.

Source: Federal Employment Agency, 2021.

turning point for this development since the second quarter of 2020. Almost every fourth person from the asylum8 states was either subject to social insurance contributions or marginally employed in 2020, after it had been just a little more than every tenth person in 2016. The employment rate for this group was 37% in February 2021. Best integrated are people of Eritrean nationality with an employment rate of 55%. Although the strong immigration waves of 2015/16 were already five years ago, labour market integration remains challenging - not least because of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (see section Effects of the COVID-19 pandemic). This becomes clearly visible when comparing the employment rates of individual immigrant groups. In February 2021, the quotas for people from states in the eastward expansion of the EU, at 60%, and for people from the Western Balkans, at 58%, were significantly higher

than those of the asylum8 states. In addition, within the framework of the Western Balkans Regulations and the Immigration Act for Skilled Personnel, labour migration to Germany is promoted in order to counter the continuing shortage of skilled workers (see the boxes for the Western Balkans Regulations and the Immigration Act for Skilled Personnel).

37 %

WAS THE EMPLOYMENT RATE FOR PEOPLE FROM THE ASYLUM8 STATES IN FEBRUARY 2021.

Development of the Western Balkans Regulation

The Western Balkans Regulation, which has been in force since 2016, states that citizens of the Western Balkans are allowed to work in Germany provided they have a binding job offer and the approval of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA).⁴⁸ There are no requirements for professional qualifications. In October 2020, the Western Balkans Regulation was extended for a further three years and a limit on the annual influx of 25,000 workers was introduced. The high level of interest on the part of employers and employees is reflected in the fact that the BA issued around 244,200 pre-consents in the context of the Western Balkans Regulation between November 2015 and May 2020. Around 57,800 cases were rejected. In general, a successful labour market integration within the framework of the Western Balkans Regulation could be observed up until the COVID-19 pandemic: high employment rates, stable employment, comparable earnings at different qualification levels as well as low unemployment and benefit recipient rates in 2016 and 2017 prove this. The majority of the people affected were employed in the construction industry during this period (44%), while almost 13% were employed in the catering industry and 11% in health and social services. The long waiting times involved in applying for a visa are likely to have resulted in uncertainties concerning work planning, and in fewer employment contracts being concluded. In April 2020 getting an appointment at 5 of the 6 diplomatic missions in the Western Balkans involved a wait of over a year.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ See § 26 para. 2 of the Employment Ordinance.

⁴⁹ See Brücker et al. (2020).



Step by step to the desired training

By Klaus Walraf

“I’m happy because I work with a lot of people and I enjoy my work,” says Hirut Brhanu. The 30-year-old started her training as a dental assistant in Rosenheim in September 2020. “I live in my own little apartment and I can walk to work,” she says happily. The Eritrean has now been in Germany for four years. The first year was tough: she lived for four months in an initial reception center in Fürstenfeldbruck, then she moved to Rosenheim and


waited there for six months to be recognized as a person entitled to asylum. When her papers were complete, she was able to learn German at the adult education center. The B1 certificate was the key to the next step: a middle school diploma. The ambitious young woman turned to the director of the adult education center and received information about the Malteser Training Support Center (AFZ) in Bad Aibling.

Hirut Brhanu lived for two years with three other young women in the shared apartment that is part of the building complex of the AFZ. It was the time before COVID-19, when joint activities with other young occupants and caregivers were common and contributed to good teamwork and a good learning atmosphere. At the AFZ the mentors support the young men and women and men very intensively and individually because there is a lot of catching up to do. Hirut Brhanu failed to graduate from high school at the first attempt and had to extend her stay in the AFZ. With COVID-19 and the switch to online lessons from spring 2020 onwards, it became even more difficult for the students. Still, Hirut Brhanu got the high school diploma in the summer. "I was really happy and totally relieved," she describes the moment when the certificate was handed over.

Then she wrote applications, mainly to dental practices, because she had noticed previously in some internships that this professional field appealed to her the most. In autumn 2020, she started her training in a large Rosenheim joint practise with five dentists and their team. Over three days, Hirut Brhanu learns how to care for healthy teeth and how to treat unhealthy ones. She goes to the vocational school twice a week - online, of course. AFZ mentor Korbinian Tschernuth helps her, mainly by doing German and English exercises with her in video conferences. "I have to practice and learn a lot, but it's OK," says Hirut Brhanu. Her eagerness to complete this training seems unchecked.



The 30-year-old Hirut Brhanu discovered her apprenticeship during an internship.



Immigration Act for Skilled Personnel

The shortage of qualified skilled workers has been discussed in Germany for several years under the heading of “skilled labour shortage”. In March 2020, the Immigration Act for Skilled Personnel came into force, which is intended to promote labour migration from third countries. It provides that qualified skilled workers from third countries can immigrate to Germany, provided they have a concrete job offer. This applies to people with a university degree as well as to people with recognized professional training. They also have the option of entering the country for six months to look for a job and receive permanent residency after four instead of five years.⁵⁰ Skilled workers with voca-

tional training can also travel to Germany for supplementary qualifications in order to equate the vocational training acquired abroad with a domestic one (e.g., with the help of a work permit).⁵¹ The effects of this law cannot be assessed meaningfully yet at the time of going to press due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated entry restrictions.⁵² Despite the difficult visa application and entry requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic, almost 30,000 visas were issued from March to December 2020.⁵³

⁵⁰ See SVR Migration (2021). Immigration for the purpose of gainful employment.

⁵¹ See SVR Migration (2021). Immigration for the purpose of gainful employment.

⁵² See SVR Migration (2021). Immigration Act for Skilled Personnel in Germany: the COVID-19 pandemic slows down targeted effects.

⁵³ See Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (2021). One year of Immigration Act for Skilled Personnel.

Although the employment of refugees increased again after the first lockdown in the summer of 2020, the increase in 2020 was significantly lower than in the years before. The employment rate of people from the asylum states was lowest in May 2020 with a decline of two percentage points compared to the end of 2019. Since then it has developed positively again and was even more than one percentage point higher in December 2020 than in December 2019. In comparison, the growth in employment in previous years was much more pronounced. In December 2019, the employment rate of people from the asylum states was four percentage points higher than in the same month of the previous year.⁵⁴ With the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the employment rates for all immigrant groups had changed between one and three percentage points compared to the previous year. The effects of the first lockdown as well as those of the subsequent openings in June 2020 were much more evident among foreign employees and especially among people from the asylum states than

among German citizens.⁵⁵ It is remarkable that employment rates among the various immigrant groups responded much more strongly and much faster to the ... than those of German citizens did. This can be justified with the work and employment structures.

When it comes to the level of requirements imposed on employees subject to social insurance contributions, the BA distinguishes between assistant, skilled worker, specialist and expert activities. Assistant and semi-skilled activities include simple (routine) activities that do not require any formal professional training. Professionally oriented activities, on the other hand, require two to three years of vocational training or a professional qualification. Specialist activities can only be carried out with a master-craftsman or technician training or with a Bachelor's degree. Highly complex activities are assigned to experts who have completed a university degree course lasting for at least four years.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See Brücker et al. (2021).

⁵⁵ See Brücker et al. (2021).

⁵⁶ See Federal Employment Agency (2021). Level of educational requirement of an occupation.

Compared to all foreigners, people from the main asylum countries of origin were employed in assistant activities significantly more often. Around every second person from the asylum states worked as an assistant in October 2020. 76% of the employees from Eritrea were in an assistant job. Most of the people in a specialist or expert position in the group of asylum states were Iranian nationals (30%). In recent years, there has also been a constant increase in labour migration of highly qualified skilled workers from India who pursue IT and natural-scientific service occupations.⁵⁷ The fact that people from the main asylum countries of origin are more likely to work in an assistant role is due to, among other things, a lack of formal employment qualifications. However, the Recognition Act of Professional Qualifications has recently contributed to securing the need for skilled workers and improving labour market integration in Germany. After successful recognition, nine out of ten skilled workers with a foreign professional qualification were employed.⁵⁸

The earnings of refugees are often in the low-pay area. At the end of 2019, two thirds of the full-time employees from the asylum states were employed in the low-pay sector.⁵⁹ For the most part, these are sectors like the catering industry in which the minimum wage has an above-average effect. In 2018, almost a third of the people from the asylum states earned a salary that was equivalent to the statutory minimum wage or below it. This was twelve percent of the total foreign employment and four percent of German employment.⁶⁰ The median gross monthly earnings of people from the asylum states were 2,035 euros at the end of 2019 and was thus 1,475 euros or 42% below that of German employees. The monthly gross earn-

ings of people in an 'assistant' role was even lower at just 1,838 euros.⁶¹

Assistant jobs done by people from ... are often in the production, company-related services and temporary employment, whereas the transport, storage and catering industries. Against this background, foreign workers in general, but in particular workers from the asylum states, were more severely affected by the economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in these sectors, which is reflected in the decline in the volume of work and the number of jobs (see section Effects of the COVID-19 pandemic).⁶²

IN OCTOBER 2020 ONE IN TWO EMPLOYEES FROM THE ASYLUM STATES WHO PAID SOCIAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS WAS WORKING IN AN ASSISTANT ROLE.

In addition, refugees are exposed to an increased risk of dismissal, as they are employed in fixed-term employment relationships 69% more often than people without a migrant background (ten percent). Furthermore, 18% of them were employed in temporary employment, i.e. in temporary work or labour leasing, which only applied to one percent of people without a migration background. In the second quarter of 2020, the sharpest drop in employment occurred particularly in the temporary employment sector.⁶³

⁵⁷ See Geis-Thöne, W. (2020).

⁵⁸ Further information on the Recognition Act can be found here: <https://www.bmbf.de/de/anzeichnung-auslaendischer-berufsqualifikationen-1091.html>, last accessed on June 11, 2021.

⁵⁹ See Federal Employment Agency (2020). Labor market integration of people seeking protection 5 years after the European refugee crisis.

⁶⁰ See Bruttel, O., & Ohlert, C. (2020).

⁶¹ See Bundestag printed matter No. 19/22312.

⁶² See Brücker et al. (2021).

⁶³ See Brücker et al. (2021).


42%

THE MEDIAN OF THE GROSS MONTHLY WAGE OF PERSONS FROM ASYLUM⁸ STATES IN 2019 WAS 42 % BELOW THAT OF GERMAN EMPLOYEES AT EUR 2,035.

69%

OF THE REFUGEES WORKED IN FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN 2019, WHEREAS ONLY 10% OF THE PERSONS WITHOUT A MIGRATION BACKGROUND WERE EMPLOYED ON A FIXED-TERM BASIS.

Figure 15:
Employment shares according to requirement level and nationality in October 2020



Note: These are employees subject to social insurance contributions excluding trainees (six-monthly figures). Values below five percent are not shown for better readability.

Source: Federal Employment Agency, 2021.

Start-up activities by people with a migration background

Due to their above-average start-up activities, the proportion of self-employed persons with a migration background is increasing in Germany. Around every fourth business start-up in Germany is launched by a person with a migration background. In the period from 2005 to 2019, the number of self-employed persons with a migration background grew from around 517,000 to 791,000 persons (+ 53%). By contrast, the number of self-employed persons without a migration background decreased by ten percent in the same period, which illustrates the importance of immigration to the German start-up landscape. In 2018, migrant founders had a net income that was 44% higher than that of employees.

EVERY FOURTH COMPANY IN GERMANY IS SET UP BY A PERSON WITH A MIGRATION BACKGROUND.

In 2018, 20% of the start-ups were launched by people with a migration background. More than half of them were not born in Germany and therefore have their own migration experience. In such start-ups, English is spoken more often (54%) than in the general average (30%). These teams are also more international and almost half of the start-ups have good or very good international networks. Reasons that make it difficult to start out in self-employment are in particular language barriers (56%) or bureaucratic hurdles (49%), according to the study. A lack of a culture of acceptance was mentioned by only 14% of those questioned.

Development in the training market

Through training, immigrants become independent of state transfer payments and have more contact with German colleagues at work. Both aspects are beneficial for integration. While the number of internships declined when compared to 2016 and 2019, the number of companies that employed refugees in regular employment or training increased.⁶⁴ Around every fourth company employed refugees during this period. In the case of building and other trade sector companies the share was as high as 43%. A lack of knowledge of the German language (86%), a lack of professional knowledge (78%) or significant bureaucratic hurdles (71%) were stated as a hindrance to employment.⁶⁵

The BA records applicants for vocational training positions in a reporting year from October 1 to September 30. The number of people in the context of refugee migration who applied for vocational training between October 2020 and April 2021 fell by eight percent to 23,500 people compared to the previous year (see Figure 16). A little more than a third of the applicants obtained an apprentice position by April 2021 in the reporting year of 2020/2021. Every tenth training company stated that they would be able to offer or fill fewer training places in the 2020/2021 training year. Regarding the catering industry, which employs many refugees, the proportion was as high as 28%. Uncertain business expectations (93%) and financial reasons (71%) were cited as an explanation.⁶⁶

One in five companies has trained refugees up to now, although the drop-out rates have been greatly increased.⁶⁷ Four out of ten of the companies surveyed stated as the reason that the vocational college was overburdened due to a lack of school education or insufficient language skills among trainees. However, there was a lack of theoretical knowledge regardless of the practical

⁶⁴ See Pierenkemper, S., & Heuer, C. (2020).

⁶⁵ See Pierenkemper, S., & Heuer, C. (2020).

⁶⁶ See Bellmann et al. (2021).

⁶⁷ See Tratt, B. (2020).

or physical ability of the refugees in their training. Further reasons for the more frequent training dropouts were unexcused absences or delays, dissatisfaction with the remuneration as well as false expectations regarding apprenticeships or the lack of any such expectations.⁶⁸ The probability of dropping out was reduced and satisfaction levels were increased through the use of additional tutoring in the vocational college as well as through trainees' personal friendships and social integration within the apprenticeship companies, and by providing explanations of the dual training system in Germany. Mediation by relatives, friends or acquaintances prevented misconceptions or false expectations in relation to apprenticeships.⁶⁹

Unemployment rates fell continuously for all population groups until the end of 2019 (see Figure 17). In April and May 2020, however, the unemployment figures and the unemployment rate rose abruptly as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, ending the positive development from 2017 to 2019. The unemployment rate for Germans was around six percent in February 2021. The unemployment rate for foreign workers was 16% (+ 2.6 percentage points compared to February 2020). Concerning people from the asylum states, it increased the most – by around three percentage points – and was 37% in February 2021. Among the group of asylum states, Syrian nationals had the highest rate of unemployment at 45%.

“Most refugees expect to be employed in two years. To ensure that their expectations are not disappointed and that this in turn has no negative effect on integration, refugees must be adequately informed about the labour market and the necessary qualifications upon arrival.”

Felicitas Schikora, DIW weekly report 34/2020, p. 571

In contrast to the employment statistics, refugees can be identified directly in the unemployment figures (see Figure 18). Around 364,600 refugees were looking for work in April 2021, of which 207,500 were registered as unemployed. Thus, there were around 9,500 more unemployed than in the previous year and 49,500 more unemployed people than in April 2019. This increase can be traced back to the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in interruptions or terminations of integration courses and qualification measures.⁷⁰ According to an IAB study, over 70% of the increased unemployment among people from the asylum states between April and December 2020 consisted of people who had previously participated in integration courses, language courses, other labour market policy measures or other training.⁷¹

More than half of the unemployed people from the asylum states were Syrian refugees (59%), followed by Afghan (14%) and Iraqi refugees (13%). 94% of the refugees who were registered as unemployed had a residence permit, almost four percent had a temporary permission to stay and almost two percent had a temporary stay of deportation. Almost two thirds of the unemployed with a refugee background were male. Around half were under 35 years of age and had a lower school-leaving qualification than the intermediate high school certificate. At 74%, the vast majority of the unemployed persons wanted to work as an assistant role.⁷² Structural barriers such as a lack of language skills or professional qualifications probably mean that the labour market integration of refugees takes longer than that of other immigrant groups.⁷³

⁶⁸ See Tratt, B. (2020).

⁶⁹ See Tratt, B. (2020).


⁷⁰ See Brücker et al. (2021).

⁷¹ See Brücker et al. (2021).

⁷² The evaluation of socio-demographic information includes not only the asylum states, but all asylum countries of origin.

⁷³ See Federal Employment Agency (2021). Effects of migration on the labor market.

Figure 16:
Applicants in the context of forced migration for vocational training positions



Note: Successful and pending applications for the reporting month April are differentiated by color. Applicants who have been successful have already obtained an apprenticeship position. A reporting year refers to the period from October 1st to September 30th.

Source: Federal Employment Agency, 2021.

BY **8%**,

THE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS FOR AN APPRENTICESHIP POSITION BETWEEN OCTOBER 2020 AND APRIL 2021 FELL COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR.


16%

WAS THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF THE TOTAL FOREIGN LABOUR FORCE IN FEBRUARY 2021. WITH 37 PERCENT, IT WAS SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER FOR PEOPLE FROM THE ASYLUM8 STATES.

BY **3%** POINTS,

THIS IS THE RATE BY WHICH THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF PEOPLE FROM ASYLUM8 STATES INCREASED COMPARING FEBRUARY 2021 TO FEBRUARY 2020.

Figure 17:
Unemployment rates of the German and foreign labour force



Note: Due to a significant under-reporting of the initial data on marginal part-time employment in November 2019, the Federal Employment Agency does not report the unemployment rates for November 2020. The line for foreigners records the unemployment rate for the group of all foreigners.

Source: Federal Employment Agency, 2021.


364,600

REFUGEES FROM THE ASYLUM⁸ STATES
WERE REGISTERED AS JOB SEEKERS IN APRIL
2021. 207,500 OF THESE WERE UNEMPLOYED.

+ 9,500

THE FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT AGENCY
REPORTED MORE UNEMPLOYED
REFUGEES IN APRIL 2021 COMPARED
TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR.

Figure 18:
Unemployed people in the context of forced migration
from the asylum⁸ states



Source: Federal Employment Agency, 2021.

In addition to unemployment and a precarious employment situation, the extent of moonlighting is an indicator that there is a need for action for refugees on the German labour market. Illegal employment of refugees gained more public attention, especially in the years of 2016/17, when there was a large number of immigrants.⁷⁴ So far, however, it has been difficult to reliably evaluate the role of moonlighting because there are no estimates or records in regard to the extent of moonlighting or illegal employment of refugees. A survey by Doerr et al. (2021) as part of the ifm refugee survey 2018 in Baden-Wuerttemberg closes this gap for the first time.⁷⁵ 30% of the 1,200 refugees surveyed said they had already worked illegally in Germany. The proportion of moonlighting was almost as high as the stated proportion of regular employment (41%). On the employees' side, monetary reasons such as quick money (60%), tax savings or fewer cuts in social benefits (40%) were given for moonlighting. Other motives are the lack of a work permit (30%), avoiding formalities (17%) or language barriers and a lack of knowledge about the legal situation (9%).

In addition to these hurdles, current studies show that employers and the resident population play a decisive role in integrating immigrants into the German labour market. The attitude of the resident population was often overlooked as a factor when structural and personal integration barriers were in the focus of the labour market studies.⁷⁶ According to the refugees, the majority of employers had monetary reasons for not registering employees for social insurance. They cited savings in tax payments or social insurance contributions (70%) and lower wages (53%).⁷⁷ The role of the resident population can also be emphasized with regard to the number of unemployed. Greater trust on the part of the resident population towards immigrant groups increased the likelihood of a transition from unemployment to employment. The confidence of the German residential

⁷⁴ See Tangermann, J., & Grote, J. (2017).

⁷⁵ See Doerr et al. (2021).

⁷⁶ See Keita, S., & Valette, J. (2020).

⁷⁷ See Doerr et al. (2021).

population was in turn dependent on the country of origin of the employees (e.g., Romania 29%, Austria 78%).⁷⁸ Influencing factors were cultural differences, different political and legal systems, and religious traditions. Another factor in labour market integration were social networks, which have a positive effect on the likelihood of finding a job, provided they are mobilized in the search for a job. The following applies: the larger the network, the quicker the first job is obtained.⁷⁹

The connection between a successful job search, contacts and trust raises the question of whether the labour market integration of certain immigrant groups in Germany is inhibited by discrimination. In an experiment with 5,800 fictitious applications between October 2014 and April 2016, Koopmans et al. (2019) show that hiring decisions are shaped by group stereotypes. At the time, systematic discrimination against minorities that are culturally closer to Germany. At the same time, the systematic discrimination of individual groups on the German labour market was discovered. This included Muslims as well as Blacks, which Koopmans et al. (2019) explain by the fact that these groups are believed to exhibit the greatest differences in values concerning moral concepts in terms of freedom, autonomy and gender equality.⁸⁰ However, there is still a need for further research dealing with the issues of moonlighting and discrimination in the German labour market against the background of recent migration for reasons of flight.

⁷⁸ See Keita, S., & Valette, J. (2020).

⁷⁹ See Gërxhani, K., & Kosyakova, Y. (2020).

⁸⁰ See Koopmans et al. (2019).

The COVID-19 effect on unemployment

Using the data from the BA, the effects of the COVID-19 crisis on unemployment can be estimated. It is assumed that without the COVID-19 pandemic, unemployment would have developed at the usual level of the previous months.⁸¹


It is estimated that by March 2021, 24% of the foreign unemployed have become unemployed in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. A differentiation according to the main immigration groups shows that the effects on unemployment in the asylum8 states were more dynamic (see Figure 19). In the months from September 2020 to the beginning of 2021, there was a significantly lower COVID-19 effect, so that the number of unemployed fell to around 15,800 people by January 2021 (six percent of all unemployed from the asylum8 states). In regard to people from countries in

the eastward expansion of the EU, there was also a reduction in the COVID-19 effect over the second half of 2020, followed by an increase in March 2021. At the beginning of the year, the COVID-19 effect decreased in mathematical terms. The recovery process in the labour market was suspended due to renewed restrictions from November 2020 on, but continued in spring 2021.⁸²

⁸¹ The exact calculation of the COVID-19 effect is shown in the monthly report on the labor and training market in June 2020, see https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/daten/arbeitsmarktbericht-juni-2020-_ba146561.pdf, last accessed on June 7th, 2021.

⁸² Federal Employment Agency (2021). Compact labor market. Effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the labor and training market. Status: May 2021

Figure 19:
COVID-19 effect on unemployment in regard to selected nationalities



Note: Here people are not considered in the context of flight, rather they are only differentiated according to their nationality. For this reason, the number of unemployed differs from that in Figure 18. The dashed lines represent the development of unemployment figures without the COVID-19 pandemic. The comparison periods are the months from April 2019 to March 2020.


Source: Federal Employment Agency, 2021.

Short-time work, home office and reduction of working hours as an adaptation to the crisis

Relocating to the home office, short-time working and working time adjustments are important tools for adapting to a crisis. Refugees in particular were severely affected by short-time work and job cuts due to the COVID-19 pandemic (see Figure 21). The reasons for this are fixed-term employment relationships, shorter periods of service and the fact that refugees are more likely to be working in assistant roles. At the same time, however, six out of ten refugees were working in a profession that is relevant to the critical infrastructure in Germany ("essential workers")⁸³. These include, for example, cleaning professions, logistics, transport or food production.

While the majority of activities carried out by employees with or without a migration background is compatible with home office working, this was only possible in 39% of the cases for refugees (see Figure 20). Of all groups, refugees were the ones least likely to work from home with just three percent in the second and third quarters of 2020, but they worked short-time more often than people without a migration background (25%). Female refugees were more often affected by short-time working than male refugees. Working hours were reduced most in the group of people with a migration background who had not fled their countries (40%). Women were most affected by this. Particularly in the case of persons with a part-time sideline job, the risk of reduction in working hours was significantly increased. In some cases, however, working hours increased during the pandemic. This is particularly true of people without a migration background (20%).⁸⁴


Figure 20:
System relevance and home office before COVID-19 pandemic



Note: The figure includes people between the ages of 18 and 64. The BIBB-BAuA employment survey of 2018 was used for the home office compatibility.

Source: Brücker et al. (2021).

Figure 21:
Home office, short-time work and working time adjustments in the second and third quarters of 2020



⁸³ In the COVID-19 pandemic, occupations that are classified under the critical infrastructure, such as occupations in the health system, food retailing, the judiciary, logistics and passenger transport, are referred to as systemically relevant. See DeZIM Research Notes (2020). Systemically relevant and precariously employed: how migrants preserve our community.

⁸⁴ See Brücker et al. (2021).

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees in 2016 and 2017, weighted.

How it went on: Nour Alfadel and Ribal Kousa

The youth group leader Nour Alfadel and the rescue worker Ribal Kousa were introduced in the Malteser Migration Report 2019. What are the two of them doing today?



Football fan Ribal Kousa is ready to start his training as a paramedic.

Ribal Kousa (34) from Aleppo found inner peace in Germany. Together with his wife Aya, the Syrian fled the civil war in 2014, which had destroyed their livelihoods and massively threatened their lives. After numerous stops, the couple reached Paderborn, where Ribal Kousa's sister lived and studied. Although he was full of hope for a better future, the young textile salesman could not have imagined at that time that he would start a completely new professional career in his new home. In 2017, he started in the federal voluntary service, qualified as a rescue worker and was permanently employed by the Malteser charity a year later. Today he works full-time in the Malteser transport service and takes patients to the doctor or picks them up from hospital. If the need arises, he also helps out by responding to peoples' emergency alarms. He has many good and few bad experiences with people in his daily work and hopes one day he will be able to work in the ambulance service.

Ribal Kousa submitted his naturalization application in 2021. Under the section 'Special Information' he can list his work in the ambulance service for the Malteser charity. His knowledge of German, as is the case for his wife, is no longer a problem. "I have the CI (German language proficiency) certificate, he says with some pride. Ribal Kousa and his wife have arrived in Germany and feel "at home" here. A fan of Borussia Dortmund and SC Paderborn football clubs, he continues to focus on the possibility of working in the ambulance service, which would be his 'dream job'. There's no prospect of this at the moment, but he hopes that there will soon be a chance to start a paramedic training. In any event he's ready to seize the opportunity.



Although she misses having a laugh and communicating with other people, Nour Alfadel remains positive.

Nour is attending the “Upper Secondary Vocational College of Commerce Foreign Languages” for the second year now, where she has specialized in English and French. The online lessons in the two pandemic years of 2020/21 are difficult for her. She's just someone who needs people around her, wants to talk to them directly and laugh with them. Her Instagram account with more than 7,000 followers is no substitute for this either. The Malteser youth group which Noura helps to lead is also operating very differently to how Noura would like it to – because of COVID-19: with more digital interactions, and normal interactions with one another. To be “outside” in Constance with the eight or nine children is “a highlight” that she and the children hold on to for a few weeks before there is something new again, she says. But Nour thinks positively, wants to continue despite all the restrictions caused by COVID-19: she still wants to achieve the general higher education entrance qualification. The advanced technical college entrance qualification after the end of the vocational college is an intermediate step for her.

Nour Alfadel has remained the happy young woman from Constance. Unfortunately, her living situation has not changed. The Syrian woman still shares a 4-room apartment with her four siblings and her parents. Since she fled from Syria she has lived in cramped conditions which she would like to escape from. When she was 14, the “Mädelstreff”, a local facility for girls with and without a migration background, supported her. Because she loves this togetherness so much and likes to get involved, she joined a Malteser youth group sometime later. Since 2019 she has been learning to lead a group of young girls and boys, and has passed her passionate commitment on to her younger sister Heba. In 2021 both of them will complete the course as youth group leaders.

Laissez faire, laissez passer. Of Migration and Freedom

By Prof. Dr. Karen Horn

The COVID-19 pandemic has shrunk everything, from traffic jams to economic performance. Migration movements are also well below their previous year's level. Even if the pandemic subsides as the vaccination campaign progresses, they will also pick up again. This is not only a cause for concern, it is also an expression of the desire to live in freedom. It has become all too common to perceive migration as a problem: because many people do not like to leave their homeland, but are forced to do so by sometimes dramatic circumstances, because they are not welcomed with open arms in their destination countries, because integrating large numbers of immigrants from distant cultures can be difficult for a society. All of this is true in many cases, but it is only one sad side of the phenomenon.

It is therefore desirable to have a greater awareness of the positive aspect of the issue: the fact that the possibility of migration means freedom. Whether oppressed, threatened or just adventurous and ambitious, for the individual migration is usually associated with setting out into the future and the hope of a better life. Anyone who is free-thinking cannot disapprove of that. A major change of place, from one country to another, even from one continent to the next, can also be part of being the architect of one's own fortune. It is an expression of the much lauded personal responsibility. And the communities that grow from outside in this way experience new impulses, greater cultural diversity and increased productivity. All of this, of course, is rejected by those countries that prevent liberal immigration and thus prevent or at least inhibit general social exchange as well as economic transactions be-

tween their native citizens and newcomers. Nowadays this is the rule which is applied more or less strictly and which is rarely questioned.

The reality of borders

"Laissez faire, laissez passer" in the real sense of the word cannot be found anywhere, despite the admonitions of the Scottish philosopher Adam Smith, who found it necessary to write in "The Wealth of Nations" in 1776: "The patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury of his neighbour, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a blatant encroachment on the lawful freedom of both the worker and those who might be willing to employ him [...]. The affected anxiety of the law-giver lest they should employ an improper person, is evidently as impertinent as it is oppressive."⁸⁵

A world with completely open borders, which allows any migration to take its course, is certainly a utopian dream. In reality, this is opposed by territorial nation-states. They may be recent phenomenon in human history, but they are here. Their borders define the scope of nationally created law and thus also the group of people to which the government's power extends. The former judge of the Federal Constitutional Court

⁸⁵ Adam Smith (1776/1999): *Untersuchung über Wesen und Ursachen des Reichtums der Völker*, Band I, Düsseldorf: Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen, I.x.c.12 (p. 190).

Udo di Fabio sees this as a logical necessity: "Without borders and limitations, there is no further requirement on the open constitutional state to be a functionally controllable association of persons in order to guarantee its protective and regulatory function in a predictable manner."⁸⁶ The political-philosophical tradition is based on this definition for the most part, subsuming immigration barriers under the concept of the nation as a moral home for the autonomy of people.

Last but not least, the general sensitivities given are a point against completely open borders. Obviously, the days are now past when an increase in population from outside was considered to be something worth striving for in general. There is nationalism and National Socialist thinking. There is also a subjective fear among some people of what is alien to them, the perceived threat to the familiar, to their own lifestyles, to the common values postulated by consensus, to the workplace. This has to be expected. It is pointless to push it to the back of your mind in favour of utopia. "We start from here," the winner of the Nobel Prize for economics James M. Buchanan used to say.⁸⁷

Voting with their feet

But since moods are not set in stone, it seems advisable especially against this background to keep reminding ourselves of the basic benefits of migration – and of the loss involved in not allowing it or only allowing it to a limited extent. Most importantly, migration is tantamount to a classic "voting with one's feet": the possibility of evading a rule and turning to another one instead is an element of human political freedom that is by no means a substitute for political freedom vested in the active and passive right to vote in democratic states, but it supplements it in a meaningful way – just like the knife and the fork at the dining table, which are also useful



Prof. Dr. Karen Horn lectures in the history of economic thought and financial journalism at the Political Science Faculty of the University of Erfurt and is co-chair and coordinator of the international scientific network for order economics and social philosophy (NOUS). She lives in Zurich. Her latest book is called "Economic Medicine Cabinet" (NZZ Libro, 2019).

individually, but only unfold their full effectiveness when they are used together, as the jurist Ilya Somin explains it.⁸⁸ For a large part of the world population – according to Freedom House⁸⁹, more than a third live in countries that are not free – migration is the only chance to exercise political freedom at all.

The high economic and psychological costs that migrants take upon themselves tend to be compensated by the circumstance that their decision does in fact have relevant consequences for them, unlike their decisions when going to the polls. This advantage is all the more important the more they are disadvantaged within the political process of their country of origin. From a political and economic point of view, the right to vote, as indispensable as it is, has several weak spots: individual questions are seldom voted on at all, the probability of being outvoted by others is up to almost 50% and the chance of tipping the scales is vanishingly small. But the person who dares to undertake a migration ends up somewhere else. He may have had illusions about this

⁸⁶ Udo di Fabio (2015): Welt aus den Fugen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 14.9.2015.

⁸⁷ James M. Buchanan (1975/2000): The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, in Collected Works, Vol. 7, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, p. xv.

⁸⁸ Ilya Somin (2020): Free to Move: Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom. Oxford University Press: New York, p. 42.

⁸⁹ Freedom House (2018), Freedom in the World 2018, New York.

place. But his incentive to get fully informed is greater than to take part in an election which he cannot decide.

This aspect of political freedom is obviously not considered to be important in countries where immigration is restricted or prohibited. On the other hand, the reference to the right of political self-determination of citizens in a country can be heard all the more frequently in this discussion. Doesn't a community which doesn't open up have the right to do so by definition? Yes, of course, precisely because the political system within the territory of the nation state does not only apply to the citizens of that state – it must also derive its legitimacy from them. Philosophically, however, this argument stands on feet of clay. Even a democracy cannot be democratic and thus perfectly legitimized down to the last detail, precisely because the inclusion of a person in a state and the determination of his right to participate in the procedures of collective decision-making there remain arbitrary in the end.

The original sin of arbitrariness

The expression 'club theory' is often used in this context, although it is completely unsuitable. According to this theory the members of a club, like citizens, have rights of ownership in relation to the club and are free to accept or reject new members. This approach is unsuitable because the "Theory of Clubs" is not a philosophical legitimacy theory, but a financial analysis framework being interpreted in a much more narrow way. Conceived by James M. Buchanan,⁹⁰ it is used to derive an optimal number of members when a good - for example a sports facility - can be used collectively, but the capacities are limited. This approach can by no means be transferred to the issue of immigration: precisely which capacities should be seen as finite in the face of immigration? And who should be able to claim a right of ownership in relation to these capacities which would entitle him to exercise them? The club theory cannot be the source or

basis of political legitimacy, rather it is a logical precondition for it.

Regarding the decision concerning who belongs to a state and who not, who is allowed to immigrate and who has to stay outside, who gets which rights and to whom these rights are denied, there is, from a liberal point of view, an original sin of arbitrariness and unequal treatment of people, which should in theory and in practice be considered to be one and the same thing. So if we want to live freely we shouldn't face each other as members of separate groups, but rather simply interact as human beings who are ultimately the same, warns the political scientist Chandran Kukathas warns.⁹¹ Without fundamental equality, freedom is only de facto superior power.

The demand made by the philosopher Martha Nussbaum⁹² as a compromise proposal to adhere to the postulate of the right of nations to self-determination, but to allow the absorption capacity of the labour market as the only criterion in regard to the immigration issue rather than cultural homogeneity, ethnicity or religion, appears to be naive. As a rule, the decision about the status of insiders and outsiders is made in terms of identity politics, writes Kukathas. Ultimately, immigration policy is always about determining "good" identities.⁹³ And the decision about what they consist of gets caught up in a tussle between very different interests which is destructive to freedom, equality and the rule of law within a nation.

Beginning of the end of equality

Indeed, a state that limits immigration must first control it. However, immigration control does not only mean regulating border crossings, but observing and sanctioning human actions in a much more comprehensive sense. Therefore, the access

⁹⁰ James M. Buchanan (1965), *An economic theory of clubs*, *Economica* 32 (125), pp. 1-14.

⁹¹ Chandran Kukathas (2021), *Immigration and Freedom*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, p. 7.

⁹² Nussbaum (2019), p. 231 f.

⁹³ Kukathas (2021), p. 122.

of authorities is extended beyond the immigrants to all residents - with serious and intrusive consequences even regarding the most personal relationships, for example if a couple who are of different nationalities has to prove that they did not enter into a mere marriage of convenience. Misjudgments are inevitable. Not to mention the fact that the rules which are applied are often neither consistent in terms of their substance nor of their timing.

Even the definition of the criteria for such reviews by the responsible authorities is a perfect example of arrogance, arbitrariness and indignity. Just think of the virginity tests the United Kingdom came up with for brides from India who were following their husbands in the 1970s. It takes place with a good deal of racism. A restrictive immigration law is normatively not neutral, but it has a strong active effect in regard to the social concept of "race" as well as in the way in which it is enforced in practice, Kukathas emphasizes.⁹⁴ After all, legislation alone is not enough, but it is necessary for enforcement to create a corresponding awareness in the population and to encourage them to actively participate in keeping insiders and outsiders apart. But that is the beginning of the end of the liberal idea of equality.

Immigration as an economic factor

The economic price of immigration barriers is also high. Or expressed positively: the freedom to migrate pays off. Immigration is a powerful economic factor. Some estimates go as far as to claim that liberalness around the world could double global economic output.⁹⁵ Theoretically, this is obvious: if workers can move around freely, this helps to fill positions in the country of immigration for which nobody can be found there - be it because the work is unqualified and unpopular or because there are too few people

with the necessary training. In addition, the purchasing power of immigrants is not entirely drained away even if they transfer a lot of money to their old homeland, but it stimulates the economy in terms of additional demand. But immigration not only means better allocation, it also has a beneficial dynamic aspect: it expands the domestic market and deepens the division of labour. This results in increased productivity.

It would be a blessing if all these arguments, which show migration in a much more favourable light than usual, were given more space in public debates once the COVID-19 pandemic has subsided. "Laissez faire, laissez passer": even if this utopian dream cannot be realized in our complicated, emotionally charged reality that has developed over the course of time, it should serve as a guiding star for us. We should be aware of the costs which are caused by everything deviating from it - especially the cost to our freedom.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 118.

⁹⁵ Michael Clemens (2011), Economics and emigration: Trillion dollar bills left on the sidewalk?, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25, pp. 83-106.

Crime - Felonies and Human Trafficking





Crime - Felonies and Human Trafficking

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld and Katharina Pfeil

The link between migration and crime continues to be a topic of significant public attention. Criminal behaviour is often associated with integration problems and a person's origins. The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the objectification of the topic of crime in the context of asylum seekers and, in addition to looking at the criminal offenses, to consider the victims of crime. For example, asylum seekers are more likely to become victims of crime themselves, for instance due to persecution in their country of origin, violence, financial or sexual exploitation while fleeing, or xenophobic violence in the host country.

This chapter gives an overview of the current situation and of crime trends in Germany over the past two years. In the first part of the chapter, the origin, socio-demographic backgrounds and frequency of various crimes committed by suspected asylum seekers are examined in more detail based on the Police Crime Statistics 2020 (PKS). Subsequently, a differentiation is made as to which groups of people the crimes were directed against. A comparison between the media coverage of violent crime and the statistically recorded suspects in the PKS will show the special role of the media in the public perception of foreigners suspected of committing crimes. Furthermore, the development of xenophobic crimes is discussed.⁹⁶

The second part of the chapter is devoted to the issues of human trafficking and exploitation in the context of immigration. First, human trafficking and its manifestations are conceptually defined, and the reasons for human trafficking are discussed. Finally, the existing data on human trafficking in Germany is presented and discussed.

Crime trends since 2018

In 2020, crime has again decreased significantly. The proportion of registered suspects decreased by three percent (see Figure 22). The decline in crime among asylum seekers was even more pronounced than the overall decline in the PKS. Compared to 2019, ten percent fewer asylum seekers were recorded as suspects. They accounted for seven percent of all suspects. Thus, asylum seekers were suspected of crimes more often than their share of the total population of about two percent.

⁹⁶ The figures shown below do not take into account violations of the law on foreigners, as these criminal offenses cannot be committed by the general population, but only by foreigners. This includes "offenses against the Residence Act, the Asylum Act and the Freedom of Movement Act / EU". The delimitation of general crime made in this way makes it possible to compare the number of cases with those of the resident population. In this chapter, those seeking protection correspond to the category "immigrants" in the PKS. This refers to persons in ongoing asylum proceedings, persons with recognized protection status, tolerated persons and persons residing in Germany without permission.

AROUND
136,600
 SUSPECTS SEEKING
 ASYLUM WERE
 RECORDED IN GENERAL
 CRIME IN 2020 (WITHOUT
 VIOLATIONS OF
 IMMIGRATION LAW).

3%

WAS THE DECREASE IN THE NUMBER
 OF SUSPECTS COMPARED TO 2019.

5.3 m

CRIMES WERE RECORDED IN 2020.

30%

WAS THE SHARE OF NON-GERMANS
 AMONG ALL SUSPECTS IN 2020
 (EXCLUDING VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW
 RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONALS).

Police crime statistics (PKS)

When interpreting the PKS crime suspect statistics, it must be borne in mind that their informative value is limited for various reasons (see MM19 for a detailed account):

- Brightfield statistics: Only records detected or reported criminal offenses
- Suspicion Statistics: Covers suspects and non-convicted offenders
- Higher probability of reporting more serious offenses
- Delayed recording of criminal offenses with a long investigation period
- Multiple suspects recorded once
- The category "non-German suspects" includes foreigners living in Germany as well as tourists
- "Immigrants" category (since 2016) includes the various types of residence "asylum seekers", "persons entitled to protection and asylum seekers, quota refugees", "tolerated" or "unauthorized residence"

7%

OF ALL SUSPECTS WERE ASYLUM SEEKERS.


10%

WAS THE DECREASE IN ASYLUM SEEKERS
 COMPARED TO 2019.

86%

OF THE SUSPECTED ASYLUM SEEKERS IN 2020
 WERE MALE.


Figure 22:
Development of the number of suspects in Germany in one year



Note: Violations of residence or asylum procedure laws are not taken into account. Suspects seeking protection are shown in the PKS as a sub-category of non-German suspects. Thus, the total number of suspects is the sum of German and non-German suspects.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office 2021.

Figure 23:
Comparison of German, non-German and suspects seeking protection
Criminal offense in 2020




It should be noted, however, that immigrants are likely to be overrepresented in the PKS due to a higher reporting rate. On the other hand, the number of suspects could be underestimated due to multiple offenses (see box on PKS). Furthermore, the previous year's comparisons should be interpreted with caution due to the coronavirus pandemic. The pandemic-related restrictions in public spaces are likely to have led to a reduction in theft offenses in particular, as more time was spent in people's own homes.⁹⁷ There was a significant decrease in the number of crimes committed by asylum seekers between March and May 2020.⁹⁸

97 Federal Criminal Police Office (2021). Police Crime Statistics 2020. An overview of selected figures.

98 Federal Criminal Police Office (2020). Crime in the context of immigration. Key statements in the observation period Jan 1 – Sept. 30, 2020.

Figure 23 shows how many suspects from the various groups were identified in 2020, broken down by higher-level types of crime. In comparison to the distribution of crimes committed by German suspects, the groups of offenses can be identified where non-Germans and asylum seekers are under- or over-represented compared to Germans. For all groups, most were suspected of a violent crime, which mainly includes assault. About 51,300 asylum seekers were suspected of such a crime (Figure 23, left).

In many criminal offenses, non-Germans and asylum seekers were suspected of crimes with a disproportionately high frequency (Figure 23, right). They were overwhelmingly overrepresented as compared to German suspects in the case of violent crimes. In the case of sexual crimes, on the other hand, the share attributed to this group declined: After they were still con-



Note: The dark blue and gray lines indicate whether suspects of a crime are overrepresented or underrepresented compared to German suspects. Calculation as in the 2019 annual report of SVR Migration.

Source: PKS Federal Criminal Police Office 2021; own calculations; own representation.

sidered to be suspects with a disproportionately high frequency in 2018, asylum seekers were comparable to German suspects in this area of crime in 2020; the number of cases here fell by another four percent, as in the previous year.

Approximately one in three suspected asylum seekers entered the statistics as multiple offenders in 2019, meaning they were suspected of two or more offenses.⁹⁹ This corresponds to the previous year. In 2019, multiple-offense suspects committed 71% of all crimes involving suspected asylum seekers. The development of this value needs to be investigated further and incorporated into prevention strategies.

Nationalities and socio-demographics of the suspected asylum seekers

In order to classify the development of crime among asylum seekers, it is important to consider it in relation to the development of immigration to Germany. Significant differences between nationalities and their share of all asylum seekers become apparent (see Figure 24). 338% of the suspects among asylum seekers came from one of five countries of origin for asylum (Syria, Iraq, Iran, Eritrea or Somalia) for which up until August 1, 2019 there were relatively good prospects of being able to remain in Germany. They were therefore significantly underrepresented in crimes compared to their share of asylum seekers, which was nearly 54% from 2015 to 2019. In contrast, suspects from the North African Maghreb states of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia were again overrepresented by six percent. Their share of all asylum seekers from 2015 to 2019 was low, at about two percent. More than 40% of the suspected asylum seekers from the Maghreb countries were suspected of multiple crimes.¹⁰⁰ Compared to the previous year, however, the number

of suspected offenders among asylum seekers from Algeria (-28%), Morocco (-25%) and Tunisia (-15%) fell sharply.

With regard to the age and gender of the suspects among asylum seekers, there were hardly any changes compared to the previous year. The majority were male (86%) and younger than 30 (62%) in 2019. Compared with their share of asylum applications, female asylum seeker suspects were significantly underrepresented (14% suspected, 36% asylum applications).

Nationalities and socio-demographics of crime victims


Unlike suspects, victims are recorded in terms of how often they fell victim to a crime. In total, about one million victims were recorded in 2020, of which approximately 61,300 were from asylum8 states.¹⁰¹ This corresponds to six percent of all recorded crime victims. Comparing 2018 and 2019, the total number of victims decreased by about one percent; however, the percentage of people seeking protection increased by seven percent. Most of the cases involved assault offenses (79%). About half of the victims from the group of asylum seekers came from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. At 74%, male asylum seekers were the predominant victims of crime; in addition, the proportion of victims aged 18 to 21 was relatively high (15% among asylum seekers compared to eight percent overall). This can be explained, among other things, by the demographic composition of those seeking protection.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ See Federal Criminal Police Office (2020). Crime in the context of immigration, Federal Situation Report 2019. At the time of the editorial deadline, no current evaluations of multiple-crime suspects seeking protection in 2020 were available.

¹⁰⁰ See Federal Criminal Police Office (2020). Crime in the context of immigration, Federal Situation Report 2019.

¹⁰¹ No data on victims from the group of asylum seekers are available for 2020 as of the editorial deadline for this report. In 2019, around 50,500 victims were asylum seekers or had fled. The definition criteria in the group of victims ("asylum seekers / refugees") and the group of suspected asylum seekers differ, so that these groups of people can only be compared to a limited extent (Bundeskriminalamt (2020). Crime in the context of immigration, Federal Situation Report 2019.

¹⁰² See Federal Criminal Police Office (2020). Crime in the context of immigration, Federal Situation Report 2019.

Figure 24:**Comparison of the proportion of suspects with the proportion of those seeking protection by nationality**

Note: The number of asylum seekers suspects in 2019 was around 151,000, the number of those seeking asylum who applied for asylum between 2015 and 2019 was around 1.66 million. The period 2015 to 2019 was chosen for the comparison, since asylum seekers who applied for asylum in the four years are relevant for the analysis of the suspects in 2019.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office 2020 and Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2020; own representation.

55%

OF THE ASYLUM SEEKERS SUSPECTS IN 2019 CAME FROM THE ASYLUM8 STATES. ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM THESE COUNTRIES ACCOUNTED FOR 71% OF ALL ASYLUM SEEKERS.

6%

OF ALL REGISTERED VICTIMS IN 2020 WERE NATIONALS OF THE ASYLUM8 STATES.

23%

WAS THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CASES IN WHICH THOSE SEEKING PROTECTION FELL VICTIM TO CRIME INVOLVING SUSPECTED GERMAN PERPETRATOR IN 2019.

28%

WAS THE DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SUSPECTED ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ALGERIA. THE NUMBER OF MOROCCAN (-25%) AND TUNISIAN (-15%) ASYLUM SEEKER SUSPECTS IS ALSO FALLING SIGNIFICANTLY.

As Huang/Kvasnicka (2019) point out, case numbers on crimes and suspects can only provide an approximate measure of crime incidence. Furthermore, it is problematic that these case numbers can lead to distorted conclusions or to a misguided public perception, depending on the interpretation. In order to look at crime in a nuanced way, it is necessary to examine how crime is committed against the resident population by those seeking protection and vice versa. The proportion of German victims of crimes committed by suspected asylum seekers was 48% in 2019, slightly lower than the previous year.¹⁰³ Germans, in turn, became suspects in 21% of the cases in which asylum seekers became victims of a crime, an increase of about 1,900 persons compared to the previous year.

The role of the media

Media coverage contributes to the public perception of crime in relation to migration. This raises the question of the extent of differences between the reporting of German and non-German crime suspects. An analysis of violent crime reporting on German television stations and in national daily newspapers by Hestermann (2019) shows that in 2019, 31% of television reports on violent crime named the origin of the person suspected of the crime. This has almost doubled compared to 2017 (18%). In most cases, the origin of the suspects is only stated when non-Germans are reported. Thus, in comparison to the PKS, a bias in the identification of the origin of non-German suspects compared to German suspects can be seen in the media coverage of violence in 2017 and 2019 (see Figure 25).


The origin of non-German suspects was mentioned 25 times more often on television in 2017 than they are statistically recorded in the PKS. In 2019, television reports were still 19 times more likely to mention the origin of non-Germans, and newspaper reports were as much

as 32 times more likely to mention them than their share in the statistics. While these figures provide some insight into the bias of crime reporting, the interpretation of the study is limited in two respects. The random samples on which the evaluation of violence reporting in the media is based were only collected in the months of January to April during the respective years. Furthermore, the selection of television reports and newspaper reports is basically endogenous: The selection of reports is related to the public interest and is not subject to random selection from the entirety of all news stories on a given day, nor does it pursue the goal of accurately reflecting police crime suspect statistics. Nevertheless, based on the analyses of Hestermann (2019), it can be assumed that the public perception of the connection between crime and migration is shaped by public reporting and that the picture painted there overshadows the actual figures from the PKS.

¹⁰³ Offender-Victim relationships only relate to solved cases, see Federal Criminal Police Office (2020). Crime in the context of immigration, Federal Situation Report 2019.

Figure 25:

Comparison of the specifying of suspects' countries of origin in the reporting of crimes of violence compared to the proportions of suspects in the Police crime statistics (PKS in German)



Note: In 2014, the number of cases in reporting relates to 230 articles, in 2017 to 314 articles and in 2019 to 455 articles (199 TV and 256 newspapers).

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office 2020 and Hestermann (2019); own representation.

"The German Press Council, with its amended Guideline 12.1 on stating the origin of crime suspects, has given a pernicious impetus for people to be guided less by facts than by moods."

Hestermann, 2019, p. 13

AROUND **8,700**
XENOPHOBIC CRIMES THAT HAD
A RIGHT-WING POLITICAL MOTIVATION WERE RECORDED IN 2020.

Development of xenophobic crimes

In 2020, around 23,600 right-wing politically motivated crimes were recorded, which corresponds to an increase of almost six percent compared to the previous year. In the area of hate crime, xenophobic, racist, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic crimes, among others, are recorded. Offenses that are based on group-related prejudices are recorded.¹⁰⁴ In total, about 10,200 crimes were recorded in the area of hate crime in 2020 (+19% compared to 2019). The largest share can be attributed to xenophobic offenses, which amount to around 9,400 cases. Of these, around 8,700 cases were assigned to politically motivated crime from the right. After cases of xenophobic crime decreased significantly in 2017 compared to 2015/16, they increased again in the following years (see Figure 26). Since January 1, 2019, the category “xenophobic” has been recorded sepa-


ately, in which around 5,300 offenses were recorded in 2020 (+72%).¹⁰⁵ In 2020, xenophobically motivated crimes against refugees amounted to around 1,700 cases, 95% of which took place outside of accommodations.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Home Affairs (2021). Politically motivated crime in 2020.

¹⁰⁵ In this presentation, it is important to emphasize that several subject areas can be assigned to one crime, so that the sum of, for example, xenophobic, racist, anti-Semitic or xenophobic crimes does not add up to the sum of hate crime cases. See Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Home Affairs (2021).

¹⁰⁶ The figures are based on a request from the Integration Media Service to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, see <https://mediendienst-integration.de/desintegration/rassismus.html#c1333>, last accessed on June 8, 2021.

Figure 26:
Development of the number of cases of xenophobic crimes in the area of right-wing politically motivated hate crime



Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Home Affairs (2021).

Link between discrimination and the corona virus

In May 2020, UN Secretary General António Guterres criticized the fact that the coronavirus pandemic was intensifying hatred, xenophobia and scaremongering instead of solidarity.¹⁰⁷ If we look at the requests for advice at the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency between 2019 and 2020, we see a significant increase from around 3,600 to approximately 6,400 requests. Of the inquiries in 2020, approximately 30% were related to coronavirus, and the inquiries were related to a variety of causes.¹⁰⁸ In addition to discrimination against people with disabilities, for example due to non-accessible information, disadvantages due to existing protection concepts or discrimination based on age, the increase in anti-Asian discrimination is particularly striking. People who were thought to be of Asian origin reported social avoidance behaviour in the context of the pandemic, regardless of their actual origin.¹⁰⁹ A survey shows that nearly half of Asian immigrant respondents had their own experiences of discrimination during the coronavirus pandemic. The majority of those affected experienced discrimination in the form of non-verbal rejection or gestures (74%).¹¹⁰ In addition, there was an increase in public insults (62%) or a refusal of services (27%) due to perceived Chinese origin.¹¹¹ This perception was driven in no small part by the discussion in the media. According to one survey, about 29% of respondents saw Asia as being responsible for the pandemic outbreak.¹¹² In summary, the study notes, the coronavirus pandemic led to a resurgence of pre-existing hostility toward people who were thought to be of Asian origin.¹¹³

Violations of the infection protection act in 2020

In connection with the corona pandemic, the Infection Protection Act became increasingly important. Compared to the previous year, there was a sharp increase in "environmental and consumer protection crimes" in 2020 (+30%). This is not least due to the fact that the PKS lists violations of the Infection Protection Act under this category.¹¹⁴ The greatly increased monitoring of protective measures against the coronavirus led to a year-on-year increase in cases related to it from 61 cases (2019) to about 6,800 cases (2020). Examples include quarantine violations or disregard of existing contact restrictions.¹¹⁵ With regard to the suspects, it should be noted that the majority of them were German suspects (66%). In contrast, non-German suspects accounted for only 34% of violations of the Infection Control Act. Among these non-German suspects, only 23% were suspects from the group of asylum seekers. Looking at the total number of around 14,400 suspects, only eight percent of the cases involved immigrant suspects who violated the Infection Protection Act.¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁷ See United Nations (2021). "We must act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against the virus of hate".

¹⁰⁸ See Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency (2021). Annual report 2020; Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency (2020). Discrimination experiences in connection with the coronavirus crisis.

¹⁰⁹ See Suda et al. (2020).

¹¹⁰ See Media Service Integration (2021). Factsheet anti-Asian racism in the coronavirus era.

¹¹¹ See Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency (2021). Annual report 2020.

¹¹² See Suda et al. (2020).

¹¹³ See Media Service Integration (2021). Factsheet anti-Asian racism in the coronavirus era.

¹¹⁴ See Federal Criminal Police Office (2021). Police Crime Statistics 2020. An overview of selected figures.

¹¹⁵ See Federal Criminal Police Office (2021). Police Crime Statistics 2020. An overview of selected figures.

¹¹⁶ See Federal Criminal Police Office (2021). Police Crime Statistics 2020. An overview of selected figures.

Human trafficking and exploitation in the context of migration

According to the definition of the "Global Slavery Index," there are three forms of modern slavery. First, *trafficking* is understood to mean breaking or manipulating the will of a human being for the purpose of entering into a trade with the intent of exploitation. Second, it includes *slavery*. This means that one person disposes of another as if they were their property, putting them into debt bondage, forced marriage, or other forced situations. *Forced labour* is the third form of modern slavery, in which a person is forced to work under punitive threats.¹¹⁷ According to criminal law (Section 232 of the Criminal Code), the term human trafficking refers to a situation in which a person is recruited, transported, transferred, abducted, taken in or harboured on the basis of menaces or psychological or physical coercion for the purpose of exploitation.¹¹⁸

Although they are often used interchangeably, human trafficking and smuggling describe different issues. Smuggling means that a person is transported across international borders in their own interest without being able to show the required entry permit. Human trafficking, on the other hand, does not necessarily refer to border crossing, but includes exploitation under duress, deception, and threats of violence. Human trafficking may involve smuggling, but smuggling need not result in human trafficking.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that around 3.6 million people in Europe and Central Asia were in modern slavery in 2016, including 3.25 million of them in forced labour.¹¹⁹ For 2018, the Global Slavery Index ranked Germany 39th in the world and reported that about 167,000 people were living in modern slavery.¹²⁰

In its annual "Bundeslagebild Menschenhandel und Ausbeutung" (Federal Situation Report on Human Trafficking and Exploitation), the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) reports current case figures for various forms of human trafficking and distinguishes between six forms of human trafficking in accordance with the Criminal Code: human trafficking for the purpose of 1) sexual exploitation, 2) labour exploitation, 3) exploitation for the purpose of begging, 4) exploitation for the purpose of committing acts punishable by law, 5) unlawful removal of organs, and 6) exploitation of minors.¹²¹

It should be noted that the Federal Situation Report, as a Brightfield statistic, shows the completed police investigations in the respective year, which in turn relate exclusively to crime scenes in Germany. Particularly in the area of human trafficking and organized crime, it can be assumed that the Dark Field, i.e., the cases that are not known to the police, is considerable. Human trafficking takes place in secret; without controls, crimes often go undetected. This may explain why the reported numbers of human trafficking victims are so low compared to crimes against personal freedom in the PKS.¹²² Investigations are associated with high costs in terms of time and personnel; at the same time, the victims' statements are central to the presentation of evidence. Lack of victim statements due to negative experiences with Security Authorities (when seeking protection, especially in the countries of origin), fear of or dependency on the perpetrators, and a lack of victim awareness make detection more difficult.¹²³ Further, social media is increasingly being used for communication, so authorities have been able to identify pseudonyms but have not been able to identify the perpetrators or victims.¹²⁴ In this

¹¹⁷ See Global Slavery Index (2014) quoted from Marschelke, J.-C. (2015).

¹¹⁸ See Criminal Code (StGB) §232 human trafficking.

¹¹⁹ See International Labour Organization (2017). Global estimates of modern slavery: forced labour and forced marriage.

¹²⁰ See Walk Free Foundation (2018). Global Slavery Index (2018).

¹²¹ See StGB §232; Federal Criminal Police Office (2020). Human trafficking and exploitation, Federal Situation Report 2019.

¹²² See Bundestag printed paper No. 19/10903.

¹²³ See Federal Criminal Police Office (2018). Human trafficking and exploitation, Federal Situation Report 2017.

¹²⁴ See Federal Criminal Police Office (2020). Human trafficking and exploitation, Federal Situation Report 2019.

respect, the actual extent of the crime is difficult to assess.

Overall, the number of human trafficking-related cases, which stood at 423 in 2019, decreased compared to the previous year (see Figure 27). Accordingly, the numbers for suspects and victims of sexual exploitation, labour exploitation and exploitation of minors decreased compared to 2018. The segment of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation accounted for the largest share with 287 proceedings (-19.4% year-on-year) compared to the other forms of human trafficking.


The decrease in the number of cases of sexual exploitation compared to the previous year can be explained by the fact that prostitution sites were inspected more regularly due to the implementation of the Prostitution Protection Act (ProstSchG), and those responsible were sensitized and their offenses were punished more strictly. According to the BKA, this led to a shift in the illegal prostitution trade to anonymous areas such as private apartments or the internet, which makes it increasingly difficult to identify this form of human trafficking. This is evident not least from the fact that in 2019, for the first time, more victims identified were exploited in residential prostitution than in bar/brothel pros-

titution, which was still very strong in 2017 (see Figure 28).

In the area of labour exploitation, the number of cases fell by a third compared to the previous year, which is reflected in a decrease in the number of victims. A particularly large number of unreported cases can be assumed in the field of labour exploitation, since the victims are forced to work off debts in addition to their insecure residence status and for the reasons mentioned above. They are often paid well below the minimum wage, employed under dangerous conditions or housed in inhumane conditions. Since 2019, in addition to the police, the "Financial Control of Clandestine Employment" as well as other local administrative authorities are responsible for the control of accommodation of foreign workers. This has led to overlap and increased complexity in detecting trafficking for labour exploitation. In 2018, most victims of exploitation were counted in the construction and food service sectors, while in the following year labour exploitation was most common in private households (44%) and construction (35%) (see Figure 29).

The majority of the 430 suspects identified, as well as the 427 identified victims of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in 2019, came from Germany and from Eastern and South-eastern

Figure 27:
Development of practices in the area of human trafficking and exploitation



Note: The exploitation of minors was recorded for the first time in 2016. The procedures for exploitation in the commission of criminal offenses as well as in the exercise of begging have been considered separately since 2017.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office 2020.

Europe (see Figure 30 and Figure 31). A similar picture emerged in 2018. However, compared to 2018, the proportion of Bulgarian suspects was significantly higher at 19%. Criminal suspects with Nigerian nationality decreased significantly from around seven percent to below three percent in 2019, while the share of Thai criminal suspects increased from 0.9% to four percent. In terms of trafficking victims, the number of victims from Thailand increased sharply from under two percent in 2018 to 21% in 2019, while the number of victims from Nigeria decreased significantly from around 14% to three percent. The decrease in Nigerian suspects and victims shows that European cooperation to combat Nigerian human trafficking and organized crime has been effective. The high number of Thai suspects and victims can be traced back to a comprehensive investigation by the federal police in 2019.¹²⁵ The high proportion of German victims can be explained by the fact that they know their rights better, are better integrated into society and have greater trust in the authorities. This means that Germans are more likely to contact the police for the purpose of filing a report or making a statement. The suspects were predominantly male (sexual exploitation 74%, labour exploitation 86%). At 95%, women were almost exclusively victims of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking in the context of flight

The available data are not sufficiently informative for the purpose of examining the effect of migration and flight on human trafficking in Germany. According to the BKA, immigrants are particularly at risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of sexual or labour exploitation because of their personal and economic situation.¹²⁶ Situations of exploitation can arise in the

country of origin, while fleeing, or after arriving in Germany. Factors contributing to the particular vulnerability of protection seekers include passport revocation or being in debt for travelling to Germany, precarious housing lacking standards of protection against violence, and lack of privacy. This also includes uncertainty about residence rights or restricted rights such as limited access to the labour market and a lack of trust in the police and other German authorities. A lack of information about the counselling and support situation as well as the legal situation, poor language skills, trauma or feelings of guilt and threats to oneself or one's family in the country of origin also play a role.¹²⁷

It can be assumed that the number of cases of human trafficking has increased with the increase in the number of asylum seekers in Germany. For example, in 2015 and 2016, the number of contacts to specialized counselling centres for human trafficking by persons who were in the asylum process quadrupled. Most of the people who requested counselling came from West African countries, while the asylum8 states were hardly represented. In 2017, inquiries from Nigerian victims increased twelve-fold compared to the previous year.

The majority of those seeking protection were exploited while fleeing.¹²⁸ Neither the category of asylum procedure nor the protection status are recorded in the statistics of the BKA, however, so that the information from the specialized counselling centres and from the individual inquiries of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is difficult to classify and can only be interpreted to a limited extent. A new data tool, unveiled by the Federal Anti-Trafficking Coordinating Group in October 2020, will be available for additional analysis in fall 2021. The aim is to establish a transparent and


¹²⁵ See Federal Criminal Police Office (2020). Human trafficking and exploitation, Federal Situation Report 2019.

¹²⁶ See Federal Criminal Police Office (2016). Human trafficking and exploitation, Federal Situation Report 2015.

¹²⁷ See the nationwide coordination group against human trafficking (2020). Human trafficking in the context of flight.

¹²⁸ See the nationwide coordination group against human trafficking (2017). Policy Paper Displacement & Human Trafficking - Recognizing, Supporting, Protecting Those Affected.


Figure 28:
Circumstances of sexual exploitation of the registered human trafficking victims



Note: This is an excerpt. Multiple answers are possible.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office 2020.


Figure 29:
Comparison of the number of registered victims of exploitation in the construction industry and in households



Note: Multiple answers are possible. The categories "Other", "Courier Driver / Parcel Service" and "Showman" have been removed for better readability.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office 2020.


Figure 30:
Nationality of suspects in 2019 by continents (pie chart) and most common countries in Europe (bar chart)



Note: The figure refers to a total of 430 suspects identified in human trafficking for sexual exploitation in 2019. The percentage figures refer in each case to the category's share of the total number of suspects. The shaded area represents the proportion of Thai suspects.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office 2020. Data on own request; own representation.

Figure 31:
Victim nationalities in 2019 by continents (pie chart) and most common countries in Europe (bar chart)



Note: The figure refers to a total of 427 identified victims of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in 2019. The percentage figures refer in each case to the category's share of the total number of suspects. The shaded area represents the proportion of Thai victims.

Source: Federal Criminal Police Office 2020. Data on own request; own representation.

comprehensible monitoring procedure in the area of human trafficking.¹²⁹

As the report of the Council of Europe's Expert Group on Combating Human Trafficking (the so-called "GRETA Report") stated in 2019, there is a fundamental need in Germany to improve the data situation on human trafficking.¹³⁰ Federal government actions, while improving, fell short of minimum anti-trafficking standards in some areas. The expert group pointed out that in 2018 only 23% of convicted offenders received a prison sentence, while the rest got away with a suspended sentence. There was also criticism of the fact that fewer victims were identified and that the data on the number of victims and their whereabouts were incomplete. Forms of exploitation other than sexual exploitation, such as labour exploitation, are not prioritized enough. With regard to asylum seekers as victims of trafficking, the GRETA report emphasized that Germany's data and mechanisms for identifying victims among asylum seekers, particularly in initial reception facilities, were inadequate and, accordingly, urgently needed to be strengthened. There is currently no national human trafficking action plan in Germany.

¹²⁹ See the nationwide coordination group against human trafficking (2020). *Defining the Gap: Data Collection on Human Trafficking and Exploitation in Germany - The Civil Society Approach of the KOK*.

¹³⁰ See GRETA (2019). *Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by Germany*.

"Let's end modern slavery together!"

In conversation with the Ambassador of the Order of Malta to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, based in Geneva, Prof. Dr. Michel Veuthey.

Ambassador, human trafficking - what exactly does the term mean?

Human trafficking is nothing more than modern slavery. And today it takes many forms: people are sexually exploited or abused for labour; they are forced to commit criminal acts such as theft or drug trafficking. We know about forced marriage and the unspeakable organ trade. And just think of the children: quite a few are "trained" to be child soldiers, not to say: manipulated. Let's not forget the tremendous suffering caused by sexual abuse and child pornography.

To put it in a nutshell: human trafficking always means exploiting vulnerable people for financial gain.

In which countries does human trafficking take place and how many people are affected worldwide?

The bad thing is, it happens every day and everywhere. Most of the time we can not even notice it. Also in Europe. It violates universal human rights and is therefore a global challenge that we must all face up to. It is not only contrary to the fundamental values of Christianity or other religions: human trafficking destroys freedom, dignity and life of many people. It destroys hopes and destroys the souls of many.

Incidentally, more people are in slavery today than at any other time in history: according to various estimates, between 40 and 100 million children, women and men live in this modern slavery worldwide, i.e. three out of every 1,000 people! Around three quarters of them are women and children. According to the United Nations, slavery is divided into 50% sexual exploitation, 40% forced labour, and six percent

forced crime. According to the Global Slavery Index Report 2018, 800,000 slaves are said to have resided in 13 European countries alone. As I said, all of this is often invisible. On our doorstep.

More people in slavery than ever before

What is the relationship between human trafficking and migration?

First of all, we have to distinguish between human trafficking and human smuggling. Human smuggling is the illegal assistance in crossing the border. Especially in recent years, many desperate people became migrants and fugitives. They often become "customers" of human smugglers due to the lack of accessible and legal alternatives. And as a result, they run the risk of falling into the hands of human traffickers. For when governmental and non-governmental humanitarian aid programs for refugees are not effective enough, or their funding is cut back, then smugglers and human traffickers, of all people, become the "experts" when it comes to exploiting these inadequacies.

Why is the Order of Malta addressing human trafficking?

Since it was founded in the Holy Land 900 years ago, the Order of Malta has formulated two goals in one guiding principle: the witness of faith and help for the weakest. That drives it to this day, is a constant impetus and benchmark. And among the most vulnerable today are undoubtedly the victims of human trafficking. Incidentally, Pope Francis has placed particular

emphasis on the elimination of human trafficking: In December 2014, Catholic, Orthodox, Anglican, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist spiritual leaders signed a joint declaration against modern slavery. In it, they call for a commitment to spiritual and practical action to help victims and combat this perpetual violation of human rights. In July 2017, the Order of Malta decided to appoint two ambassadors to monitor and combat trafficking in human beings: one in Africa and one in Europe.

Disposable culture that views people as "commodities".

What exactly are you doing to combat human trafficking and what successes have you already achieved?

As one of these ambassadors, it is my task to present ideas and proposals to the governing body of the Order of Malta on how to specifically combat human trafficking. I also contact official bodies and try to establish fruitful cooperation with authorities and experts. My counterparts are representatives of countries, governments, religious authorities, international organizations, non-governmental organizations as well as research, academic and religious institutions which are responsible for the issue of human trafficking.

We also regularly intervene at the United Nations, for example the UN General Assembly, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the UN Human Rights Council. We are thus making a contribution to raising awareness. We support the work of the International Institute for Humanitarian Law and carry out a research program at the University of Nice. Incidentally, this year we gave a lecture at the annual meeting of the Austrian Bishops' Conference. We organize freely accessible webinars, some with English, French and German subtitles. We collect best practice examples on special websites (e.g. www.christusliberat.org) and offer free online courses for people helping victims of human trafficking (www.cuhd.org). As you can see, that's pretty extensive.



Prof. Dr. Michel Veuthey fights against human trafficking as ambassador of the Order of Malta.

What is particularly challenging in the fight against human trafficking?

The biggest challenge is that most of the victims are helpless because they have been torn from their families, their country. And then they still encounter language barriers. They live in legal limbo and without access to justice. Trafficking is a difficult, complex phenomenon that requires broad cooperation between governments and civil society, including religious organizations.

And what about the traffickers? They also benefit from the COVID-19 pandemic, irregular migration, armed conflict and climate change, which is causing such immense poverty in the countries of origin. They are also increasingly using digital channels to recruit victims and "customers": via websites, social networks, dating apps, and internet-based commercial sex.

The causes of human trafficking can be found everywhere - and yet they are ignored. The pursuit of profit, the influx of refugees and lawless spaces create a great human drama. Human dignity is trampled on in this market - the "customers" must also know that. In the encyclical "Laudato si," Pope Francis denounces the disposable culture that views human beings as "commodities" that can be freely exploited, disposed of or offered for sale.

Raising public awareness of criminal barbarism

How can we counter human trafficking in Germany and the EU?

We must draw attention to this great global problem and should strive for a global coalition of states, religious leaders and communities, private and public international organizations, artists, universities and many more. A look at recent history shows that the highlighting of such issues can be successful: In 1997, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines achieved the acceptance of the Ottawa Convention. In 1998, the coalition for the International Criminal Court pushed through the adoption of the Rome Statute, i.e. the legal basis for the prosecution of, for example, genocide or crimes against humanity.

So we urgently need more specific provisions against human trafficking! However, these must then also be effectively enforced. This is only possible if, for example, employees in immigration authorities, the police and border security, judges and lawyers have received appropriate training. It is also important to ensure the pro-

tection and rehabilitation of survivors and, above all, access to justice: this is the only way to prosecute human traffickers. But we must also work in our countries for better psychological and medical care, especially for women and children.

Even if I repeat myself: We have to make the public aware of the criminal barbarism of human trafficking and take the perspective of the victims. There are already international treaties and national legislation; but they must also be implemented effectively and completely! Human trafficking is and will remain a crime against humanity. Let's end this modern slavery together.

Ambassador, thank you for talking to us.

Human trafficking on our doorstep

The specialist advice centre JADWIGA¹³¹ helps female victims of human trafficking in Bavaria. The following examples from the field of forced labour and forced prostitution are taken from their testimonies. Names have been changed to protect the identities of the affected individuals in the following examples.

Elena from Romania - forced labour in gastronomy

Elena met Mr. Y. in her home country of Romania. He visited her at her parents' house for family dinners, and everyone was expecting a wedding soon. Then she travelled with him to Germany, where she worked part-time as a waitress in his Turkish café. In return, she had been promised 500 euros as a monthly salary. When the wages were not paid and she approached Mr. Y. about it, an argument ensued. Elena then wanted to return home, but through beatings and death threats, Mr. Y. and his friend forced her to continue working. She tried to escape, but failed and the men took her ID away. Elena was beaten again and forced at knife point to sign a promissory note for EUR 15,000. Fortunately, she managed to escape the next day and filed a police report. JADWIGA supported Elena in returning to her family.

Emese from Hungary - betrayed by her family

The nightmare of Emese, a 19-year-old Hungarian, began when she was just 6 years old and her mother died. As a result, she lived alone for several years with her father, who sexually abused her. When he finally remarried, Emese hoped to finally have a family again with the stepmother and her two daughters moving in - but she was bitterly disappointed. When Emese turned 17, the stepmother and step-sisters took her to Germany, where they promised her a better life. However, that was only a pretext, because instead she was forced into prostitution there by her family. To keep her docile and unable to fight back, her stepsisters continuously drugged her. It was only after two years that the young woman, who was severely psychologically traumatized, was recognized by the police as a possible victim of human trafficking and referred to the JADWIGA counselling centre.

¹³¹ The organization responsible for the two JADWIGA (www.jadwiga-online.de) advisory centres for female victims of human trafficking in Munich and Nuremberg is the ecumenical non-profit "STOP dem Frauenhandel gGmbH". Partners are the Association for International Youth Work, Landesverein Bayern eV and IN VIA Catholic Girls' Social Work, Landesverband Bayern eV.

Social Participation - Integration of Refugees





Social Participation - Integration of Refugees

Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Lars P. Feld and Katharina Pfeil

Integration is a multifaceted process and takes place in various areas of society. The different areas of integration include identification with the host country, social participation and belonging, integration through education, work and language as well as social contact with the resident population. The integration climate in Germany has been stable since 2015.¹³² Integration successes have been emerging so far, particularly with regard to social contacts, employment expectations, and participation. When presenting the progress of integration, it is important to take into account different requirements and initial situations dependent on age and life situation.¹³³ Refugee children and young people have a greater need for educational opportunities and care, and at the same time, more opportunities to make social contacts than refugee adults. In accordance with the procedure in the 2019 Malteser Migration Report and based on the Essers (2001) categorization system, three areas of the integration of refugees are highlighted below: identificatory, cognitive-cultural, and social integration.¹³⁴ For this purpose, the current data from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees who have immigrated to Germany since 2013 are broken down (see box IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey). The chapter ends with an overview of the latest research results regarding the effects of the corona pandemic on the integration of refugees in Germany.

IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Interviews with Refugees.

The IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey is an annually repeated survey of refugees carried out by the Research Centre of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) in cooperation with the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). In addition to the people who entered Germany between January 2013 and August 2019, their household members are also asked about their current living conditions in Germany. The survey extends over the years 2016 to 2019, and has meanwhile resulted in a total sample of 8,153 people. The participants were questioned with varying frequency: 2,771 once, 2,036 twice, 2,105 three times and 1,241 people four times.¹³⁵ The following evaluations relate to adult asylum seekers who have moved to Germany since 2013. They consist of 4,351 person observations in 2016, 5,484 in 2017, 4,280 in 2018, and 3,820 in 2019. The data from the fourth wave of the survey was published in spring 2021. With the help of weighting procedures, representative statements can be made about the experiences and attitudes of refugees in Germany. The weights used are preliminary.

¹³² See SVR Migration (2020). Moving closer together in times of distance. SVR Integration Barometer 2020.

¹³³ See Kristen, C., & Spiess, K. (2020).

¹³⁴ See Esser, H. (2001).

¹³⁵ See Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2021). IAB-BAMF-SOEP-Interviews with Refugees.

Identification-related integration

Successful identificatory integration is based on reciprocity. This means that not only the attitude of the refugees plays a role for their success, but also the behaviour and mentality of the host society towards migration issues. The attitudes and expectations of the host society have a direct influence on the perceived disadvantages or experiences of discrimination of the refugees. Both are hurdles for those seeking protection in society.

Attitudes towards refugees have developed positively overall in the German resident population; the two groups have come closer together. While concerns about immigration had increased between 2013 and 2016, almost a third of the population was still very concerned in 2018. Concerns have declined since 2016, but are still above 2013 levels. Two thirds of the respondents saw more risks in the refugee migration, and only eight percent of the respondents assessed the immigration as a short-term prospect. When asked about their assessment of what refugee migration would mean for Germany in the long term, a quarter saw it as an opportunity. Overall, the population in the rural regions of Germany was significantly more sceptical than in the cities, especially about the cultural impact of refugee migration.¹³⁶

In 2018 and 2019, more than three quarters of the refugees surveyed felt either “completely” or “mostly” welcome in Germany (see Figure 32). This means that the feeling of welcome has remained at a constant level since 2016 and 2017. The feeling of welcome is an important indicator of the life satisfaction of refugees in Germany. At the same time, satisfaction and a feeling of welcome depend heavily on concerns about xenophobia and experiences of discrimination.¹³⁷ While concern about refugee migration on the part of the resident population continued to decline, fear of xenophobia increased among the refugees.

In 2019, 21% of those surveyed had some concerns about xenophobia in Germany (see Figure 33); around one in ten refugees stated that they were very worried. In comparison, just under a quarter had occasionally had the personal experience of being discriminated against in Germany because of their origin. Two percent said they were often discriminated against.

Also of importance is the perceived trust in central public institutions, which allows conclusions to be drawn about the integration and settling of refugees. This trust can be read as an indicator that refugees accept state institutions and their actions, and thus trust in a functioning constitutional state. Only slightly more than every third refugee had full confidence in the public administration in Germany in 2018 (see Figure 34). In comparison, trust in other institutions such as the government (48%), the legal system (50%), or the police (59%) was much more pronounced.

Generally speaking, the level of trust is high. According to the Advisory Council on Integration and Migration (SVR Migration), a so-called honeymoon effect occurs in the youngest immigrant group: New immigrants are more satisfied and more confident in politics than immigrants who have been in Germany for several years.¹³⁸ However, every fourth to every third person does not have a great deal of trust in democratic institutions. Greater transparency in decisions and processes that affect refugees could strengthen trust, and thus the existing legitimacy of the institutions.¹³⁹

A fundamentally positive development can be noted with regard to social participation (see Figure 35). The proportion of respondents who had a feeling of social isolation very often to often in 2016/2017 reduced to half the previous value, i.e. twelve percent in 2018/2019. In addition, in 2016/2017, a quarter of the refugees still felt that they were very often or often outside of the mainstream of society, which in 2018/2019


¹³⁶ See Schmidt et al. (2020).

¹³⁷ See Schmidt et al. (2020).

¹³⁸ See SVR Migration (2020). Moving closer together in times of distance. SVR Integration Barometer 2020.

¹³⁹ See Niehues et al. (2021).


Figure 32:
Do you feel welcome in Germany today?



Note: The answer categories "Completely" and "Mostly" as well as "In some ways" and "Rarely" are presented together. N = 705.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees 2018-2019, weighted.

Figure 33:
Concerns about xenophobia in comparison to personal experience of discrimination in 2019




Comment: "How often have you personally had the experience of having been discriminated against here in Germany because of your origin?" (N = 279) and "Are you worried about racism and xenophobia in Germany?" (N = 3,820). Values below five percent are not shown for better readability. Due to rounding, there may be slight deviations from 100% in the data description of some graphics.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP-survey of refugees, weighted.

THE FEELING OF BEING VERY OFTEN OR OFTEN SOCIALLY ISOLATED WAS HALVED IN 2018/2019 COMPARED TO 2016/2017 AND WAS 12%.

Figure 34:
Full confidence in the rule of law in 2018



Comment: "How much trust do you have in the public administration / German government / legal system / police?" (N = 3,854). The answer category "full confidence" is shown.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees in 2016 and 2017, weighted.

only applied to 14% of the people. In regard to their stated attachment to their homeland, there has been a decreasing trend since 2016. In the four following years, the very strong to strong feeling of attachment to their homeland among refugees from the main asylum countries of origin decreased continuously from 51% to 38%.

Cognitive-cultural integration

Language acquisition and participation in educational and training measures play a central role in the integration of immigrants. The acquisition of German language skills and professional qualifications increase the chances of a successful integration into the labour market, as well as opportunities for contact in the social environment. These in turn promote involvement and participation in social life.¹⁴⁰


¹⁴⁰ See Niehues et al. (2021).

On average, refugees are not as well educated as Germans and other immigrant groups. In particular, the proportion of people with higher level education or additional education in school, training, or education in the university system is low: 35% of the refugees have a primary school certificate as the highest level of education. In relation to the level of education in the respective country of origin, however, the majority of refugees are well educated and above average.¹⁴¹

Participation in education, i.e. the proportion of refugees who go to school, study, do vocational training or further education, developed positively between 2016 and 2018, but decreased slightly in 2019 (see Figure 36). Almost every

¹⁴¹ As Kristen et al. (2020) emphasize, it is important to include relative education (= education in the context of the country of origin) in the analysis of the progress of integration, since relatively more educated refugees learn the language more quickly and integration into the labor market takes place more quickly.

Figure 35:
Assessments of participation in society



Note: "How often do you feel like you're left out?" and "How often do you feel that you are socially isolated?" (N = 705 for 2018/2019 and N = 7,257 for 2016/2017).

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees in 2016 and 2017, weighted.

fourth refugee was integrated into the German education system. There are clear gender differences: While the proportion of male refugees in education was 16% in 2019, the proportion of female refugees fell by one percentage point compared to the previous year and was eight percent. Refugee women are often responsible for housework and childcare, which means that they only accept training at a later point in time or not at all.¹⁴² This can be seen, not least by the fact that women only participate in language courses with some delay after moving.¹⁴³

The refugees' knowledge of German has improved continuously over the past four years (see Figure 37). In 2019, almost half of the respondents had a very good to good knowledge of German. Four years earlier, this only applied to one in five refugees. The proportion of refugees who had no knowledge of German fell from 14% in 2016 to four percent in 2019. Factors such as length of stay, private accommodation, doing language courses, contact with Germans, and the time that is spent learning German each week have had a positive effect on German language skills.¹⁴⁴

The positive development in the assessment of language skills is reflected in the equally high rate of language course participation. From 2016 to 2019, 90% of male and 79% of female refugees attended at least one language course. However, an increasing saturation effect can be presumed, insofar as participation in language courses is no longer growing as strongly as in previous years (from 2018 to 2019 +3 percentage points). The situation is similar with participation in integration courses, in which seven out of ten refugees had taken part by 2019.¹⁴⁵

Male, young, and well-educated refugees are comparatively more successful in language acquisition and thus have more contact with Germans (see social integration). It can be assumed that knowl-

edge of German language skills and contact mutually reinforce each other. Improvement in German language skills makes it easier to establish contact with Germans, and through increasing contact with Germans, German language skills also improve. Experience shows that older or female refugees with children benefit less from this.¹⁴⁶

One explanation for poorer German language skills among older or female refugees, is that they are less likely to be employed or involved in training where communication is predominantly in German. This illustrates the key role that labour and training markets play in integration issues. The proportion of refugees who predominantly communicated in German at work was at a high level of over 80% between 2017 and 2019. In comparison, the proportion of people who predominantly speak German as part of their training was slightly higher (92%), and only decreased in 2018 before increasing again in 2019.

Significantly less German is spoken at home than in the workplace (see Figure 38). In 2019, 67% of the refugees within the family predominantly used the language of their country of origin. Five percent spoke predominantly German. More German was spoken in circles of friends than with family; at the same time, this value has increased continuously in recent years. Almost a third communicated with friends predominantly in German, while a smaller proportion of 29% predominantly used the language of the country of origin.

¹⁴² See Kosyakova et al. (2021).


¹⁴³ See Niehues et al. (2021).

¹⁴⁴ See Niehues et al. (2021).

¹⁴⁵ See Niehues et al. (2021).

¹⁴⁶ See Niehues et al. (2021).


Figure 36:
Development of participation in education by gender



Note: "Are you currently in training? This means: are you attending a school or university, including a doctorate, are you doing vocational training or are you taking part in a continuing education course?" (N = 1,513 to 3,302). The answer category "Yes" is shown.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees in 2016 and 2017, weighted.

Figure 37:
Assessment of knowledge of German



Note: "How well can you speak/write/read the German language?" The German language skills are summarized here as an average of the skills in the three areas "speaking", "writing", and "reading." (N = 3,819 to 5,477).

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees in 2016 and 2017, weighted.

24%

OF THOSE SURVEYED HAD A SCHOOL COMPLETION CERTIFICATE, UNIVERSITY DEGREE, OR VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN 2019.

Social integration: contacts and living

The area of social integration looks at social relationships between refugees and people in the host society.¹⁴⁷ Social networks and other methods of contact create connections between otherwise distant groups. In addition, they can support access to institutions and information that are important for coexistence. Furthermore, personal contact can break down prejudices and thus improve the integration conditions.¹⁴⁸ In recent years, contact between refugees and the local population have developed positively. In 2019, more than half of the refugees spent time with Germans on a daily or frequent basis (see Figure 39). At the same time, almost every fifth

person never spent time with Germans.¹⁴⁹ While children and adolescents came into contact with the majority population more frequently, regular contact between adults and Germans was more cautious, especially where female refugees were concerned.¹⁵⁰ This can be clearly seen in contacts at work (see Figure 40). 52% of male refugees had daily or frequent contact with Germans, while this figure was less than half of that for female refugees at 23%. Across genders, however, it is positive that the frequency of contact and the time spent with Germans have increased in the last four years.


¹⁴⁷ See also Kristen, C., & Spieß, K. (2020).

¹⁴⁸ See SVR Migration (2020). Moving closer together in times of distance. SVR Integration Barometer 2020.

¹⁴⁹ See also Niehues et al. (2021).

¹⁵⁰ See Kristen, C., & Spiess, K. (2020).

Figure 38:
Language usage in the private sphere in 2019



Note: "In which language do you speak to your friends/family members here in Germany?" (N = 3,541). The category "Mainly in another language" and "Equally in different languages" fall under "Other". Values below five percent are not shown for better readability.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees in 2016 and 2017, weighted.

49%

OF THE REFUGEES RATED THEIR GERMAN LANGUAGE SKILLS AS VERY GOOD TO GOOD IN 2019.

90%

OF THE MALE REFUGEES ATTENDED A LANGUAGE COURSE FROM 2016 TO 2019.

Growing together - offline and online

By Klaus Walraf

In Berlin, Laetitia Gräber (19) is committed to ten-year-old Zarah from Syria with heart and soul - they have grown together over the past few months. When Zarah's parents were looking for support for their eldest daughter in English and math in the summer of 2020, Laetitia had just graduated from high school and the COVID-19 numbers allowed personal meetings in Berlin. The two quickly fell in love with each other and have met regularly since then - in the park or online during hard lockdown.

The Malteser Integration Service helps 150 people who have settled in Berlin after their emigration. More than 40 volunteers like Laetitia are involved in digital language tandems. Most of these volunteers are around 30 years old and are constantly on the computer or laptop. In September 2020 - after it was foreseeable that Corona would further restrict peoples' everyday lives - the Malteser initiated the digital language tandem. With the fund provided by a generous sponsor from the insurance industry, 60 laptops were purchased. So everyone who needs help with learning can get in touch with their mentor. An hour, usually once a week, is spent studying or talking - the main thing is to "maintain closeness". Learning German via video conference is even more difficult than it already is. But the refugees are not alone, and they can ask questions. What stands out: "Lessons on the screen are more disciplined, they really learn and do not stray off-topic much," says Agyad Malek, the coordinator at the Berlin Integration Service. For most of them, an additional hour is enough.

In the second year of the corona pandemic, a certain degree of "digital fatigue" occurred, the organizers note, but an antidote has also been found for this: other topics, small groups. In these, for example, two or three refugee women



Despite Corona, the volunteer Laetitia and ten-year-old Zarah from Syria meet regularly - preferably in the park; if that doesn't work, online.

exchange ideas with their German mentor. They send out a recipe and each prepare the dish for themselves at home. When the video camera comes on, they eat and discuss what it tastes like. But the small groups also have politics, climate change, vaccination, and corona rules on their agenda. The important thing is that contact remains. "Thank you for not leaving me alone," is a sentence that refugees often say or write.

This sentence applies increasingly to people who have emigrated themselves. Because many people who have fled the country want to help

"Thank you for not leaving me alone"

others in the same situation. After completing school or training, they register as a mentor with the Malteser. Prerequisites: good language skills and an open ear. Because Corona has shown that it is not necessary to drive halfway through the city to help new fellow citizens and to contribute something to the confluence of society. For many, WLAN access is enough.

Coronavirus shopping service for the elderly

By Klaus Walraf

Ms. Hoffmann's phone rings every Monday in the Prohlis district of Dresden: it's time for her to provide her shopping list. Because of coronavirus, she doesn't want to be immersed in the crowds of people at the supermarket. Michaela Platz sits at the other end of the line and is busy taking notes. The head of the Malteser Integration Service in Dresden notes the weekly requirement that the volunteers bring to the 90-year-old's front door on Tuesday. Not only in Dresden, but at 90 locations around the country, Malteser volunteers shop for people with disabilities or who are temporarily living in quarantine.

Potatoes, oranges, milk, bread, and washing powder are on the list. - "How are you, Ms. Hoffmann?" asks Michaela Platz and soon senses that the old lady has a lot on her mind. It has become quieter, the elderly are feeling the coronavirus restrictions especially hard. Ms. Hoffmann used to enjoy the afternoon games for the elderly and families, which the Malteser offers

in the "Prohlis Meeting Point" for families with and without refugee experience. Excursions were also on her program from time to time. Half an hour on the park railway through the "Great Garden" helps to dispel the sense of confinement that grows when you are stuck at home.

A little closeness despite lockdown

Mrs. Hoffmann regularly used the "mobile shopping cart": Volunteers with and without a migrant background accompany the participants during the shopping trips in a senior-friendly vehicle and when shopping in the store. Manar Mawed is always there too. Ms. Hoffmann particularly appreciates having coffee together after shopping. One talks about his or her life story and current experiences. "You get to know the people personally and know what they had to go through before and during their escape and what tasks they are facing today," says Ms. Hoffmann.

Even during the lockdowns, the volunteers came up with something special for the older men and women. For example, since January they have been writing them letters and sending them Easter cards, enclosing recipes and photos of themselves. Sometimes there were whole groups of children who were busy doing handicrafts and sending their works of art to the seniors.

The shopping service is the only personal thing in lockdown, Manar Mawed also regrets: "We leave the shopping bags at the front door and talk to each other briefly, and yet we miss the rounds of discussion in the café without any space or time pressures. Hopefully it will be like that again soon."



Volunteer Manar Mawed and 90-year-old Ms. Hoffmann at the handoff of the shopping.

Satisfied with the experience in the Malteser integration service

Volunteers have been involved in the Malteser Integration Service since 2015 and support refugees as they integrate into the German host society. In recent years around 5,000 refugees have been supported by 2,000 volunteers, with around 15% of the volunteers having a history of emigration themselves. In a large-scale survey in October 2020, volunteers and refugees were asked about their experiences of this program that is offered by Malteser in order to enable further improvements to be made to integration opportunities based on the results that were obtained.

Overall, the 470 refugees interviewed spoke very positively about the voluntary support and emphasized its advantages. Nine out of ten refugees say that they not only learned a lot about life in Germany through the volunteers, but also got to know other refugees or people from the host society. 87% of the refugees surveyed state with high or the highest rating, that they feel more comfortable in Germany when they are accompanied by volunteers in the integration service.

85% of the respondents state that they fully or largely know who they can turn to with their questions thanks to the helpers, and 44% of the respondents fully or largely agreed with the statement that they - after they themselves were assisted- are more likely to help other refugees.

However, every fifth refugee states that they do not use the digital integration services, or rather do not want to use them. One reason for this is a lack of the necessary technical facilities that are needed and, in some cases, insufficient WiFi.

The survey of 340 voluntary integration workers showed that around 40% of those questioned had volunteered for the Malteser for the first time. Almost every seventh person is involved in providing personal support to a particular refugee, for example as a godparent. With regard to their motivation, 81% of volunteers

said that they want to do good, and that they appreciate meeting people. For a good one in three, personal development was the reason for the commitment. For 87%, training courses are very important or important in their volunteer work because they provide a secure foundation for working with the refugees.

According to the volunteers, the experience of being recognized and respected as a person (83%) and receiving information about life in Germany (67%) are of particular importance to the refugees. Experiencing community and being in contact with other people (64%), and coping with everyday life together (53%), is important for the refugees, according to the volunteers.


52%

OF MALE REFUGEES HAD DAILY OR
FREQUENT CONTACT WITH GERMANS.

43%

OF THE REFUGEES IN LANGUAGE/
INTEGRATION COURSES STATE THAT
THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF GERMAN
DETERIORATED DURING THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC.


Figure 39:
Time spent with Germans



Note: "How often do you spend time with Germans?" (N = 3,820 to 5,482). The categories "Several times a week" and "Every week" have been combined into the "Frequently" category. The categories "every month" and "less often" have been combined into the "rarely" category. Values below five percent are not shown for better readability.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees in 2016 and 2017, weighted.

Figure 40:
Contact with Germans at work



Note: "How often do you have contact with Germans at your workplace (or at school, university)?" (N = 1,513 to 3,302). The categories "Several times a week" and "Every week" have been combined into the "Frequently" category. The categories "every month" and "less often" have been combined into the "rarely" category. Values below five percent are not shown for better readability.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees in 2016 and 2017, weighted.

Integration effects of the coronavirus pandemic

The previous four waves of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey show the status and progress of integration between 2016 and 2019. It can be assumed that the coronavirus pandemic had a significant effect on the development of the integration of refugees. However, these effects will only become apparent in the data from the fifth and sixth waves of surveys from 2020 and 2021.

Initial studies of the integration-related effects of the corona pandemic indicate that course interruptions, the switch to digital courses, and the contact restrictions in 2020 have had a negative impact on the cognitive, cultural, and social integration progress of refugees. In a survey from July and August 2020, 73% of the participants in integration and language courses stated that the course was interrupted by the corona pandemic. For eleven percent, the course was completely cancelled. 16% of the refugees surveyed in an integration or language course reported that their course was only offered virtually.¹⁵¹ In addition, the frequency of contact with Germans decreased: The proportion of people who had contact with Germans several times a week or on a daily basis decreased by 29 percentage points. Consequently, the proportion of those who stated that they had infrequent or no contact with Germans increased. 43% of the refugees surveyed reckoned that their knowledge of German had deteriorated during the corona pandemic (see Figure 41). This indicates that not only will further language acquisition be impaired by the pandemic, but that refugees could also lose language skills they have already acquired.¹⁵² However, this can only be meaningfully investigated when more recent data is available.

In particular, groups that were poorly integrated, had poor German language skills, and had less contact with the majority society before the pandemic were particularly affected by the corona pandemic.¹⁵³ For women with children or for older refugees, it will be particularly challenging after the pandemic to catch up with the more integrated refugees in terms of the acquisition of language skills. This can be seen, among other things, from the fact that the proportion of refugee women who never spend time with Germans rose sharply in 2020. Among women with children under four years of age, it even increased by 22 percentage points.¹⁵⁴

In addition to the structural integration hurdles, psychological stress and loneliness can inhibit the participation of refugees in society, as these circumstances lead to the affected people increasingly withdrawing socially.¹⁵⁵ Even before the pandemic, refugees were exposed to greater psychological stress, and at the same time were lonelier than people with a migration background who had not immigrated, or than people without a migration background. During the first lockdown in 2020, the proportion of people with no refugee experience who reported feeling lonely was just as high as the feeling of loneliness among refugees who were surveyed in 2016/17.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ See Niehues et al. (2021).

¹⁵² See Niehues et al. (2021).

¹⁵³ See Niehues et al. (2021).

¹⁵⁴ See Niehues et al. (2021).


¹⁵⁵ See Entringer et al. (2021).

¹⁵⁶ See Entringer et al. (2021).

Home schooling and collective quarantines in shared accommodation can increase the feeling of being socially isolated. Refugee children were severely affected by this. Only about every second child in shared accommodation had internet access in 2018; only every fourth child had their own room and only 32% had their own desk. In comparison to children regardless of migrant background living in a private apartment, they were worst equipped. It can be assumed that these facilities will not have improved significantly by 2020. As a result, these children lacked the prerequisites to participate in digital education. If school measures do not counteract this, this could have far-reaching consequences for their subsequent labour market integration and for their social participation.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ See Rude. B. (2020).

Figure 41:
Effect of the corona pandemic on knowledge of German



Note: The data was collected as part of the COVID-19 special survey of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey of refugees (N = 1,369).

Source: Brücker et al. 2021, p. 29.

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Editorial Information

Editor

Malteser Migration Report Foundation
 Contact address: Erna-Scheffler-Straße 2,
 51103 Köln, Germany
 Email: malteser@malteser.org
www.malteser.de

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Post Script

It is to be greatly welcomed that the Malteser Organization in Germany is continuing to publish a migration report every two years. It is true that the number of people immigrating to EU countries has declined due to the pandemic; however, this is likely to be only a temporary phenomenon. In addition, many integration projects have been made significantly more difficult by the various lockdowns, with lasting consequences for successful integration.

The number of those who were expelled from their homeland or had to flee it has risen to over 80 million. I do not want to go into detail here about the factors that lead us to expect a renewed increase in the number of refugees. Many immigrants have lost their rather precarious jobs due to the pandemic, which has resulted in a significant decrease in the total amount of remittances from migrants to their families in their home countries with the consequence of growing poverty. In some countries remittances make up 15 to 20 percent of gross national product. In Africa in particular, the number of people living in “extreme” poverty is expected to increase. Growing child mortality can already be observed as a first indicator.

The challenge of combating the causes of flight or “illegal” migration is therefore even more demanding. Against this backdrop, it is depressing that it has still not been possible to bring about a more uniform European policy. With migratory pressure likely to rise again, things will become even more difficult. This year, the doctors who work together with helpers from

the Order of Malta on the ships of the Italian coast guard have already provided medical care to over 5,000 rescued people, saving many lives.

We are concerned that some countries of transit are increasingly using the transfer or retention of refugees and migrants as a means of political pressure. It’s equally difficult to accept the fact that in many cases those who have arrived in Europe are deliberately forced to inhumane conditions for years in order to prevent other people from coming.

It must be possible to create career opportunities in the countries of origin in order to reduce the pressure of migration. The repatriation of migrants without the right to stay will only be possible on a larger scale if their home states are given incentives to take back their citizens. Because of the importance of remittances, there is often no interest at all. And lastly, uniformly legal, controllable immigration opportunities must be created. A policy that focuses solely on securing external borders will not be enough in the long term, and it will also not meet European humanitarian standards. To refer asylum seekers solely to the possibility of applying for asylum in their countries of origin, for example, would constitute an inadmissible erosion of asylum law and would often make it impossible for the most severely persecuted to avail themselves of this right.

I very much welcome the fact that the Malteser Migration Report 2021 places a special focus on the topic of “human trafficking”. The number of



people in slavery has never been higher, and they have fewer rights than in the Roman Empire. Sexual exploitation and the exploitation of cheap labour are greatly promoted by migratory pressures and the lack of legal opportunities to migrate. The stage has now been reached where some people who want to emigrate agree to donate their own organs in order pay the prices demanded by smugglers.

We are far too happy to look the other way when it comes to this problem, although it also affects Germany directly. Forced prostitution is widespread here too, and we do not hesitate to buy cheap products that were made by small children or forced labourers. For several years now, the Order of Malta has appointed two special ambassadors on this subject - one based in Geneva and one in Nigeria. But much remains to be done to make this scandal more visible.

I wish the Malteser Migration Report 2021 to contribute to a rise in awareness. And I hope that the newly elected Bundestag will pay more attention to the issue of human trafficking.

ALBRECHT FREIHERR VON BOESELAGER,
Grand Chancellor of the Sovereign Order
of Malta

The Malteser in Germany

WHO WE ARE: The Malteser in Germany are a Catholic aid organization and funds stationary facilities that provide healthcare and social services under the auspices of the German Association of the Sovereign Order of Malt. In Germany, around 52,000 Malteser volunteers undertake work for people in need - regardless of their religion, origin, or political convictions. With over 35,000 full-time employees, the Malteser are also one of the largest employers in the health and social sectors. The Order of Malta, founded in the 11th century, is responsible for projects and activities in over 120 countries around the world which support the poor and the needy.

WHAT WE DO: Most of our civil rescue and disaster services, first aid training, the provision of support services to seniors, people with illness or disadvantages, youth and foreign work we do are based on volunteer work. We also operate social services, such as rescue and emergency medical services, ambulance services, home emergency assistance and food delivery services. The Malteser organization operates hospitals, senior assisted living facilities, schools and social services for youth, addicts and asylum-seekers.

HOW WE WORK: The Malteser organization today meets its Order's mission it set out to engage in 950 years ago, in a contemporary way that meets the needs of people as well as the societal framework in the most effective manner. All of our services and facilities are non-profit operations. What we generate in profits is invested into the maintenance and expansion of our service programs.

“Protecting the Faith and Serving the Sick and the Poor”

Mission Statement of the Order of Malta

